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Hundreds of Kurds living in Lebanon have gathered outside the Turkish embassy in 
Lebanon to protest Turkey’s ongoing military operation in northern Syria’s Kurdish-
controlled Afrin region. Protesters carrying Kurdish flags chanted slogans on Friday 
denouncing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, including: “Down with Erdogan!“ 
Lebanese policemen deployed around the embassy and erected barbed-wire barriers to 
prevent protesters from approaching. “All the Kurds here in Lebanon are supporting 
Afrin and saying long live the resistance of Afrin,” said protester Hanan Osman.  
(An-Nahar, January 26, 2018) 
 
This thesis provides a transnational perspective to Lebanese Kurds, particularly regarding their 
activism and networks related to Rojava, the Kurdish areas in northern Syria. After Armenians, 
Kurds form the second-largest non-Arab ethnic group in Lebanon. By estimate, around 
100,000-150,000 Kurds reside in Lebanon, most of them holding Lebanese citizenship. While 
the Kurdish presence in Lebanon dates back to the early Ottoman centuries, significant waves 
of Kurdish emigration took place in the years following the First and Second World War 
(Kawtharani & Meho 2005). Most Lebanese Kurdish families originate from the border area 
between Turkey and Syria (Ibid.). Since 2011, the war in Syria has led around 20,000 Syrian 
Kurds to seek shelter in neighboring Lebanon.  
  
Traditionally, the transnational ties between the Lebanese Kurdish community and Kurdistan 
have been close-knit. The development of their first political and social organizations in the 
1950-60s was largely influenced by Kurdish leaders in Iraq and the presence of politically active 
Syrian Kurds in Lebanon (Kawtharani & Meho 2005). In January 2018, Turkey launched an 
attack against the Kurdish forces in Afrin in northern Syria, which resulted in demonstrations 
in Kurdish communities worldwide, including Lebanon. The citation at the beginning of the 
introduction is from an article published in the Lebanese daily An-Nahar in January 2018. It 
describes one of the demonstrations organized by the Kurds in Lebanon in solidarity with the 
Kurds in Afrin. A year later, in March 2019, Lebanese Kurds demonstrated against Turkey’s 
victory in Afrin, as reported by another Lebanese newspaper, the Daily Star (March 18, 2019). 
In autumn 2019, Turkey launched another attack in northern Syria. Consequently, Kurdish 
demonstrations again took place in front of the United Nations headquarters in Beirut (Daily 
Star, October 13, 2019).  Some of my local Kurdish contacts sent me pictures from the site. 
  
The demonstrations stimulated by the Turkish interventions in Rojava were the factor that 
initially made me interested in studying the transnational relations of the Kurds in Lebanon. On 
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account of the demonstrations, the historical bonds between the Kurdish communities in 
Lebanon and Syria, and recently arrived Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lebanon, I made a 
hypothesis that the Kurds in Lebanon would be interested and active on the Rojava issue. I 
presumed that in addition to the demonstrations, the Kurds in Lebanon might be involved in 
other kinds of activities or networks to support the Kurds in northern Syria and gather support 
for the issue in Lebanon. These factors encouraged me to research transnational activism and 
transnational networks of Kurds in Lebanon concerning Rojava. The subject was very topical 
when I started my study in spring 2019, as the plight of the Kurds in northern Syria had gained 
considerable attention in international media. Furthermore, the successful resistance of the 
Kurdish forces against ISIS and the emergence of the Kurdish-led self-governance in northern 
Syria had been publicized. 
  
My research aims to find out whether, and by which means, Kurds in Lebanon try to influence 
the Rojava issue and whether they are part of some transnational networks related to Rojava. 
To answer these questions, I interviewed the presidents of four Lebanese Kurdish associations 
and one unaffiliated Syrian Kurd in Beirut in July 2019. In the analysis, I utilize the theoretical 
framework of transnational social formation, transnational activism, transnational networks, 
and forms of transnational contention. In the theory section, I will also present some 
characteristics of the transnational practices of ethnic diasporas and transnational impacts on 
domestic activism. Furthermore, I contextualize the substance by presenting an overview of the 
history of the Kurds in Lebanon, the recent political developments in the Kurdish areas of 
northern Syria, and the Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava. I have also followed the 
reporting on the Kurds in Lebanon in the Lebanese and Kurdish media. 
  
The Kurdish community in Lebanon has been tremendously understudied in the academic field. 
Only a few articles, Meho (2002), Kawtharani & Meho (2005), and Hourani (2011), have 
addressed the topic during the last two decades. There is no adequate research on the 
transnational activism and networks of the Lebanese Kurds. Hence, this thesis will provide new 
information on the Kurdish community in Lebanon and highlight their position in the 
transnational formation of the Kurds in the Middle East. Moreover, it provides new aspects to 
the recent history of the Kurds in Lebanon and Syria. Furthermore, it highlights the impact of 





2. Concepts and Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of my research is based on the study of transnationalism, 
transnational activism and transnational contention. In social research, transnationalism has 
been frequently understood as social formation spanning borders. Transnational activism seeks 
to challenge local or global status quo through the formation of transnational collective action 
and transnational contention, often carried out in transnational social movements or 
transnational advocacy networks.  
 
 
2.1. Transnationality  
Over the past decades, the concepts of transnationalism and diaspora have served as prominent 
academic lenses through which the ramifications of international migration and the shifting of 
state borders across populations have been viewed (Faist 2010, 19). The research has focused 
to define the patterns of transnational social formations, as well as the contexts in which these 
cross-border phenomena have operated, such as globalisation and multiculturalism. 
Transnationalism denotes to migrants’ durable ties across countries, and it can be used to 
capture all sorts of social formations, such as transnationally active networks, groups and 
organizations. The concept of diaspora also captures a cross-border process, it refers to religious 
or national groups living outside a real or imagined homeland. (Ibid.)  
 
Vertovec (1999, 447-449) has described transnationalism as “multiple ties and interactions 
linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states”. Transnational networks are a 
central feature to transnational social formation, and they are sustained by various modes of 
social formation, mobility and communication (Ibid.). Transnational networks are essentially 
based on some kind of common identity or shared values and goals. Participation in socio-
cultural and political activities, exchange of information and resources, and patterns of 
communication are their common characteristics. (Vertovec 2001, 573-578) Transnational 
networks often incorporate reciprocity and solidarity within kinship networks, and political 





2.2. Research on transnationality 
The concept transnationalism, transnational perspective or transnationality has been a key 
intervention in the recent decades of social research (de Jong & Dannecker 2018, 497), and it 
has become a widely used concept in several fields of academic study. In the 1990s, 
transnationalism was primarily used to describe economic phenomena with connection to the 
global reorganization of production process (Ibid.). In the field of social sciences, use of the 
concept was significantly advanced by the pioneering work of Basch, Glick Schiller and 
Szanton Blanc (1994), who connected the idea of transnationalism with dispersed diaspora 
communities and the construction of their social fields. Instead of merely portraying patterns of 
living across borders, they wanted to develop a social theory that did not set nation-state as the 
primary unit of analysis (Glick Schiller 2007, 17). The rising awareness of spatial and cultural 
interconnectedness of people, cultural objects, and economic processes compelled researchers 
from various disciplines to reassess their agendas (de Jong & Dannecker 2018, 494). 
Consequently, transnationalism has become a conceptual milestone in social sciences and 
migration studies (Waldinger 2013). It has challenged the nation-state as a self-evident unit of 
study, although the concept is still mostly linked to combination of two nation-states: the 
country of origin and the host country of diaspora communities. (de Jong & Dannecker 2018, 
496)  
 
Transnational approaches have revealed the existence of social, symbolic, political and 
economic links between the host countries and the countries of origin that create transnational 
social places (de Jong & Dannecker 2018, 496). According to Faist (2010, 19), transnational 
approaches can be productively used to study central questions of social and political change 
and transformation. According to de Jong & Dannecker (2018, 498), the maturing of 
transnationalism as a social theory and the accomplished project of demarcation of transnational 
field of studies has given the transnational perspective a position where it cannot be ignored. 
Moreover, it has opened transnational field of research for dialogue and synthesis with other 
concepts and fields (Ibid). 
 
 
2.3. Transnational activism and transnational networks 
In the last decades, various developments have facilitated the formation of transnational 
collective action: the development of electronic communications, the cheapening of 
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international travel, and flows of migration across borders (Della Porta & Tarrow 2005, 7–10). 
These phenomena have provided transnational activists with efficient communication and thus 
allowed performance of transnational campaigns (ibid.). The rising levels of education (Josselin 
& Wallace 2001, 7), and the spread of English as the lingua franca have as well facilitated the 
rise of transnational activism (Tarrow 2005, 35). Today, transnational actors constitute a diverse 
group, and thousands of transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and non-
governmental organizations have evolved around human rights, women’s rights and 
environment issues. Transnational activism may aim to influence and alter international 
politics, such as states’ foreign policies, inter-state negotiations and international organizations 
(Hägel & Peretz 2005, 470), as well as local politics (Sperling et al. 2001, 1155). Erdem (2015, 
314) argues that the role of transnational activism has become increasingly salient in the 
dynamics of world politics and it has challenged sovereignty of the states. 
 
Transnational advocacy networks are a form of transnational networks that attempt a social 
change and as such differ from ordinary everyday networks of individuals (Sperling et al. 2001, 
1155). Transnational advocacy networks are not necessarily based on a shared identity, but on 
shared principles and values. Keck & Sikkink (1998, 3) define transnational advocacy networks 
as a set of "relevant actors working internationally on an issue who are bound together by shared 
values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services”. According to 
them, besides trying to influence policy outcomes, activists may also aim to transform the terms 
and nature of the debate (Ibid.). Transnational advocacy networks function as the establishment 
of a globalized civil society (Sperling et al. 2001, 1155).  
 
Transnational advocacy networks have typically been identified as social movements, but as 
Sperling et al. (2001, 1156-1157) point out, this categorization hides some of their distinctive 
features. Whereas mass mobilization, contentious and confrontational tactics, and attempts to 
bring politics out of conventional venues into the streets have been traditional characteristics of 
social movements, advocacy networks mobilize smaller numbers of individual activists, who 
use more specialized resources of expertise and access to elites. While social movements have 
mostly relied on demonstrations of mass public support and open confrontations with 
authorities, transnational advocacy networks offer new information to political leaders and 




Despite some tactical distinctions, transnational advocacy networks and social movements have 
also common characteristics. In practice, the line between transnational advocacy networks and 
social movements is fluid. They both are principled actors, bound together by a common set of 
values and goals, and committed to social change that challenges the status quo. Hence, 
transnational advocacy networks often work with broader-based social movements with shared 
principles, and a social movement may contain a transnational advocacy networks within it. In 
turn, transnational advocacy networks often incorporate formal organizations and informal 
grassroots associations. Women’s transnational advocacy networks have been among the 
earliest and most influential of global mobilizations challenging gender hierarchy and 
improving the conditions of women’s lives. They have effectively mobilized for women’s 
suffrage, protective legislation, and violence against women. (Sperling et al. 2001, 1157) 
 
Transnational advocacy networks often encourage and contribute to the development of local 
movements. They may support grassroots mobilization, for example by offering opportunities 
for networking and models for effective local action. (Ibid. 1159-1160) Many transnational 
networks fund local civic activism as means to “strengthen the civil society”. However, such 
civic activism is typically defined as “apolitical”, since it is mostly nonpartisan and carried out 
by local voluntary organizations. (Ibid.) Sperling et al. (2001, 1169-1171) argue that grassroots 
activism should be interpreted in the means of a political act, because it attempts social change 
through its objectives on a local level. Hence, it can be seen as practical resistance to prevailing 
politics and status quo. The tendency to count only institutional politics, carried out in 
government ministries and legislatures, as political fades the political nature of civic activism. 
Even the participants of grassroots civic activism may not see their local practical resistance as 
politics, even though the practical grassroots politics of civil society constitute the fabric of 
democratic politics. (Ibid.) 
 
It is often assumed that transnational actors are autonomous in their attempts to influence states. 
However, forms of transnational actors can be distinguished by the nature of their relationship 
and their level of independence from states. The tendency of non-governmental and civil society 
organizations to present themselves as independent from states may partly fade the reciprocity 
of the relationship between transnational actors and states. The social movement theory has 
explicitly theorized social movements as actors who convey contentious politics directed 
against state politics. Hence, the role of transnational actors has frequently been seen only 
through their attempts to shape international governance by doing protests, agenda-setting and 
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lobbying directed at public officials and politicians. (Hägel & Peretz 2005, 470-474) Hägel & 
Peretz (2005, 467-468) argue that when transnational actors and states share common interests, 
there are opportunities for mutual influences. In such situations, states may try to use 
transnational actors to advance their objectives e.g. in foreign policy. Thus, states are not merely 
targets of transnational activists. On the contrary, the relationship between them is two-
dimensional and prone to reciprocity, and states can influence and even initiate transnational 
movements. (Ibid.) Reciprocal relationships between transnational actors and states are 
eminently salient in diaspora politics (Ibid. 472-474).  
 
 
2.4. Processes of transnational contention 
In order to understand the dynamics of transnational activism and contention, their processes 
need to be examined. The concept of political opportunity structure provides some means to 
examine the chances of transnational actors to successfully influence the local or global politics. 
It examines the local political environment and its prevailing dimensions which either 
encourage or discourage collective action (Tarrow 1994, 18). The five major dimensions of 
political opportunity structure are: opening up access to participation, shifts in political 
alignments, availability of influential allies, cleavages within and among allies, and state’s 
capacity and will to repress social movement (Ibid. 85-92). An open political opportunity 
structure increases the chances of a social movement to be successful, whereas a closed one 
leads to diminished chances of influence.  
 
According to Tarrow (2005, 10), there are three orders of processes that link domestic activists 
to the international system: two “local” processes, namely global framing and internalization; 
two transitional ones, called diffusion and scale shift; and two “global” processes, 
externalization and transnational coalition formation. Multiple of these processes can 
simultaneously take place in transnational movements, and they are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, diffusion can be found in the processes of global framing, scale shift, and in the 
domestic absorption of new forms of transnational contention (Ibid. 29-30).   
 
In the social movement theory in general, framing refers to construction of meanings and 
symbols in a certain way in order to mobilize social contention. The concept is based on the 
theory of social constructivism, which claims that meanings are socially constructed and 
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negotiated. (Tarrow 1994, 119) Framing activity that is used particularly in the formation of 
transnational collective action and contention can be described as global framing. It refers to 
the use of international symbols to frame domestic conflicts. (Tarrow 2005, 32-34) For instance, 
transnational activists may utilize the framing of norms of human rights, women’s rights and 
sustainable development in order to press states and international institutions to comply with 
their demands (Erdem 2015, 318). Choosing of an attractive frame is important, since the higher 
the degree of resonance the frame induces, the greater is the likelihood to successfully form 
collective action (Snow et al. 1986, 477).  Resonant discourses are often less radical than non-
resonant ones, which can lead social movement leaders to choose less radical approach in order 
to achieve greater support  and social change (Ferree 2003, 305).  
 
Internalization refers to response to foreign or international pressure within domestic politics, 
and diffusion to transfer of claims or forms of contention from one place to another (Tarrow 
2005, 32-34). Diffusion can travel either through well-connected trust networks, media and 
the internet, or movement brokers. Diffusion produces spread of ideas and the emulation of 
local forms of collective action in other places and expedites the spread of contentious politics 
around the world. (Ibid. 101-102) Scale shift is a vertical process, and refers to the change of 
the level of coordination of collective action to a different level than where it began (Ibid. 32-
34). It diffuses collective action to higher or lower levels, such as from local to global level. 
(Ibid. 205) 
 
Externalization also refers to vertical projection of domestic claims onto foreign actors or 
international institutions (Tarrow 2005, 32-34). Externalization of claims aims to gaining 
international allies and attention, even intervention, and is often done by using universalistic 
appealing terms. In conflict situations the party put on defensive most often has an interest in 
shifting venues to bring in new allies and activate friendly audiences. Externalization depends 
on the networks of domestic activists, their international allies, and parts of foreign states and 
international institutions. It works through a sequence of phases that can vary depending on the 
domestic contexts, in framing of contention, and through different forms of collective action. 
(Ibid. 144-146) The process often starts with a “blockage” of domestic claims, which leads to 
the desire for transnational intervention (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 12-13). The blockage might be 
repression or merely lack of response for the domestic claims of the group (Ibid.). In order to 
be interesting outside a country’s borders, the domestic claim must be framed in an appealing 
way. While often the symbols used for domestic audience can be extended to an international 
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level, sometimes the claim has to be appropriately reframed, such as when indigenous rights 
are reframed as human rights. In order to overcome the barriers set by repressive regimes and 
to get attention of potential allies, weak social actors may use three mechanisms: information 
diffusion, institutional access, and attention-getting direct action. (Tarrow 2005, 147) 
 
Transnational coalition formation stands for the horizontal formation of common networks 
among actors from different countries with similar claims (Tarrow 2005, 32-34). Coalitions can 
be defined as “collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational 
entities to pool resources in order to effect change”.1 There are four types of transnational 
coalitions, two of them short term and two long term. The short term ones include instrumental 
coalitions and event coalitions, and long term ones federations and campaign coalitions. 
Instrumental coalitions require only a low level of involvement and comprise groups that come 
together around an occasional conjuncture of interest or program, but drift apart after their 
common issue has dissipated. They have the lowest potential for sustained collective action. 
Event coalitions require a higher degree of involvement and have potential for future 
collaboration if the shared identities recognized during the collective action lead to formation 
of alliances. Event coalition include e.g. transnational protest events. Federated coalitions are 
long term but require only a low level of involvement from their member organizations, who 
can remain committed their own organizations’ goals, with long-term joint collaboration. As 
for campaign coalitions, they combine high intensity of involvement with long-term 
cooperation. (Tarrow 2005, 167-168)  
 
All in all, the processes at the global level, externalization and transnational coalition formation, 
have the greatest potential to create transnational social movements. The local processes, global 
framing and internalization themselves do not produce no permanent links across borders. 
Although the transitional processes, diffusion of collective action and a shift in the scale of 
contention, help to unify the repertoire of contention across borders, they are only temporary 
procedures. Hence, externalization of domestic contention and the formation of durable 
transnational coalitions are the strongest signs that a fusion of domestic and international 
contention is taking place. (Tarrow 2005, 33-34) Externalization can be seen as the first step in 
permitting domestic actors to shift their claims to venues in which they can attract support from 
                                                          
1 Levi & Murphy (2004, 5). Direct citation in Tarrow (2005, 164). 
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influential allies, and coalition formation as the process through which such alliances are forged. 
(Ibid. 179)  
 
 
2.5. Ethnic diasporas and transnational practices 
For ethnic diasporas, transnational communities abroad may provide safe havens for activism 
that would be illegal or dangerous in homeland (Vertovec 1999, 454). Institutionalised forms 
of political activism carried out by ethnic diasporas can described as transnational political 
practices. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, 2-4) defines them as “various forms of direct cross border 
participation in the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees, as well as 
their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country or international 
organizations”. For example, voting patterns or lobbying carried out by diaspora members in 
the country of residence may be influenced by homeland political events (Ibid.). 
 
As Hägel & Peretz (2005, 472-474) point out, diasporas need to assume an active role in the 
relations between host states and homelands in order to conduct transnational politics. 
Dispersed communities can directly influence homeland politics by financing specific causes 
or disseminating their vision of national identity and politics. They can try to produce indirect 
influence by lobbying host states in order to affect their foreign policy towards homelands. The 
objectives for lobbying might be e.g. increases in economic aid and military support for the 
homeland, or recognition of the homeland as an independent state. (Ibid) As Østergaard-Nielsen 
(2001, 17) noted in her study on Kurdish and Turkish political organizations in Germany, 
sometimes ethnic communities adjust their political agendas to conform to internationally 
approved discourses of human rights. The attention of central policy makers may be drawn 
more easily by the use of democracy and human rights discourse instead of a merely national 
or ethnic one. Hence, it may be practical for ethnic-based transnational actors not to emphasize 
their possibly nationalist or revolutionary visions. (Ibid) 
 
Four partly overlapping types of transnational political engagement of ethnic diasporas can be 
distinguished: immigrant politics, homeland politics, diaspora politics and trans-local politics. 
Immigrant politics refers to political activities that migrants undertake to better their situation 
in the receiving country. Homeland politics refers to political activities undertaken by dispersed 
communities pertaining their homeland domestic or foreign policies. It can either oppose or 
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support the homeland government. In turn, diaspora politics can be understood as a subset 
homeland politics. It refers to groups that are blocked from direct participation in their 
homeland political system or who do not have a political regime to oppose or support. 
Sometimes diaspora politics is used as an overlapping concept with homeland politics. Also 
trans-local politics is a subset of homeland politics, and it comprises initiatives organized from 
abroad that aim to better the situation in the local community in homeland. (Ostergaard-Nielsen 
2001, 5-6) 
 
Engagement in transnational political activities may empower the members of dispersed 
communities. However, it may also lead to disempowerment. In some cases, intensive 
engagement in homeland politics has diverted the attention of diaspora communities from 
developing the socioeconomic conditions in the country of residence. Moreover, sometimes it 
has inflicted exclusion in diaspora communities that have problems with majority and minority 
issues. Representatives of different political, ethnic or religious factions may be pressed to 
cooperate. These problems can lead to non-presentation in the institutions of the host-country 
and weaken representation in immigrant political fora. (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001, 20-22)  
 
Vertovec (1999, 449) suggests that a special characteristic of the diaspora social formation is 
the “triadic relationship” between dispersed members of an ethnic community, the state of their 
residence, and the homeland. With respect to this, Akbarzadeh et al. (2019, 2) illustrate that 
Kurds present a rather exceptional case in the context of transnational communities, since the 
bulk of their transnational network is not geographically dispersed, as most Kurds live in close 
proximity and direct contact across borders of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. Moreover, they note 
that Kurds lack the third dimension of the triad, namely a free-standing state, and suggest that 
the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan would come closest to forming it (ibid.).  
 
Walhbeck (2018, 413) points out that in regard to ethnic diasporas, the notion of homeland can 
be related either to real or imagined homeland. He argues that “homeland” should primarily be 
understood as an idea that characterizes the community. Moreover, the perception of the 
“homeland” and the political projects connected to it are often significantly influenced by some 
type of traumatic collective histories. (Ibid.) For analytic purposes, I will regard the area of the 
historical Kurdistan as the Kurdish homeland, even if it was a sub-state area or autonomous 






2.6. Transnational impacts on domestic activism 
Although the idea and the content of the human rights are largely Western by origin, they have 
proved to be important frames for social justice movements in different parts of the world. 
Merry (2006) has theorized on the translation of transnational ideas, such as human rights 
approaches and violence against women, to local social settings. She argues that transnational 
ideas need to be adapted to local institutions and meanings, and the adoption and indigenization 
of human rights discourse can be seen as one form of framing. The term indigenization refers 
to the way new ideas are framed and presented in terms of local norms, values and cultural 
practices. In many cases, local activists, feminist NGO leaders, human rights lawyers, and 
academics work in a critical role as intermediaries, who translate the transnational ideas to local 
contexts. The intermediaries or translators shuttle between the transnational community and 
home community. They both understand the world of transnational human rights and know the 
local culture, which enables them to look both ways. This is crucial, as translation of 
transnational ideas is a two-way process. Translators not only refashion global human rights or 
women’s rights agendas for local contexts as means to combat particular problems, but also 
reframe and portray local grievances in terms of these principles and the more powerful 
language of international human rights. (Merry 2006, 38-39) Simultaneously, translators work 
within national and transnational movements. Furthermore, they “negotiate the middle in a field 
of power and opportunity”. In order to get global media attention and funding from international 
donors, they have to speak the language of international human rights, while simultaneously 
they have to present their initiatives in ways that are acceptable to their local community. (Ibid. 
42) 
 
Also Tarrow (2005, 186) points to the fact that new forms of activism do not simply appear in 
different places automatically. Transfer involves diffusion of forms of activity that can be 
adapted to a variety of national and social situations. Three mechanisms are important in the 
domestication of an innovation: the existence of brokerage between its originators and its 
adopters, the presence of successful mobilization on the part of sympathetic or enthusiastic 
activists, and its certification by authoritative actors, or the failure of attempts to decertify it. 
(Ibid.) Brokerage links two or more previously unconnected social actors by a unit that mediates 
their relations with one another or more actors. (Ibid. 190) Certification refers to the validation 
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of actors, their performances, and their claims by authorities. It operates as a powerful selective 
mechanism, since the certifying actor always recognizes a limited number of performances and 
claims. (Ibid. 194) 
 
Transnational brokers provide domestic activists with access to resources, information, and 
legitimacy. For transnational activism to take hold in the new context, domestic mobilization 
must continue after external influence and intervention. Yet transnational intervention fails 
more often than it succeeds. The failure might be due to heavy-handed or culturally insensitive 
transnational agents who delegitimize their partners and produce a backlash against foreign 
intervention, dependence of domestic activists on the intervention or resistance of dissent 
domestic cultures. (Tarrow 2005, 199-200) 
 
 
2.7. Research on transnationality among the Kurds 
The Kurdish communities outside of Kurdistan constitute a global diaspora, and plenitude of 
research has been done on transnationality among the Kurds within Europe. Since the 1960s, 
large numbers of refugees have been forced to flee Kurdistan, which has led to the establishment 
of Kurdish communities all over the world (Walhbeck 2018, 413). The largest minority 
communities can be found in Europe, particularly in Germany (Ammann 2004). Walhbeck 
(2018, 413) highlights that the dispersed Kurdish communities continue to be characterized by 
the various contemporary political developments in the Kurdish regions in Iran, Iraq, Turkey 
and Syria. The Kurdish diasporas have been characterized by a discourse that presents Kurds 
as victims of persecution, which has functioned to maintain the politicized aspects of the 
Kurdish diasporas and to motivate transnational political mobilisation6 (Walhbeck 2018, 413). 
According to Alinia et al. (2014, 53), the Kurdish diaspora has become mobilized on a large 
scale especially during the last two decades, which signifies the importance of their 
transnational ties. Moreover, the Kurdish diaspora has played a pivotal role in bringing 
international attention to the Kurdish issue (Ibid.). 
 
The Kurdish communities often are highly politicized with respect to homeland politics. In 
Europe, the character of the diaspora has changed following to the growth of the proportion of 
political refugees. Yet the diasporic Kurdish identity and transnationalism and are common 
features of Kurdish diaspora communities around the world. Political developments in Turkey 
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and the Middle East have a direct link on social relations and political activities among diaspora 
Kurds. The multiple organizations and associations established by Kurds in various countries 
indicate diaspora political activities. Both well-organized organizations with a more specific 
and transnational political agenda and small local organizations with social and cultural 
activities for the local community can be found. (Walhbeck 2018, 420) Walhbeck (2018, 420) 
argues that Kurdish organizations in exile are often connected to Kurdish political movements 
in Kurdistan in their initial stages. The connection can be either explicit, or more diffuse and 
indirect, but according to him the organizations are always influenced by the political and social 
divisions and allegiances in Kurdistan in a way or another at the outset (Ibid.). 
 
In Sweden, Khayati and Dahlstedt (2014) have examined politics of belonging and the 
processes of diaspora formation among the Kurds in Sweden, describing the nature of the 
transnational networks and organisations created by the Kurdish community. They argue that 
diaspora populations act both outwards, towards the former homeland, and inwards, towards 
the country of residence. According to them, engagement and commitment in one direction do 
not exclude involvement in the other. (Ibid.) Also in Sweden, Alinia and Eliassi (2014) have 
focused on issues of identity, “homeland” and politics of belonging with regard to generational 
and temporal aspects among the Kurdish diaspora. They have noted that there are differences 
among the older and younger generations with regard to the way they identify themselves as 
migrants and Kurds as well as their perceptions of homeland and belonging (Ibid.) 
 
In Germany, Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) has analyzed trans-state political loyalties and 
activities of transnational communities among the Turkish and Kurdish communities. She has 
shown that Turkish and Kurdish organizations not only mobilize in relation to immigrant 
political issues such as citizenship rights in Germany, but also in relation to the domestic and 
foreign political situation in Turkey. Thus, they have become a linkage group between the 
countries (Ibid.). Lyon and Uçarer (2010) have examined the diffusion of Kurdish separatist 
contention to Germany, coordinated by the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK). They have 
traced the origin of Kurdish discontent in Turkey and the spilling of Kurdish activism into 
Germany through migration, diffusion, and activism. Moreover, they examined the efforts of 
the PKK to mobilize the Kurdish population in Germany. 
 
In Finland, Toivanen and Kivistö (2014) have studied the transnational aspects and relations 
that have an influence identity options available to young Kurds in the local diaspora 
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community, including the use of new information and communication technologies. Moreover, 
Toivanen (2016) has approached the transnational political ties and practices of the young 
Kurds as a matter of belonging. She argues that the transnational political setting of young 
Kurds serves for a platform for constructing and enacting modes of belonging and non-
belonging (Ibid.). 
 
In the Middle East, studies have been made on the cross-border links and transnational 
formation between Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The Kurdish communities in the 
Middle Eastern countries outside the areas of Kurdistan have been less studied. Gourlay (2018) 
has examined the way in which pan-Kurdish identification and solidarity is shaped by ongoing 
crises in the Middle East. He argues that amid conflict, previously divided Kurdish populations 
increase cross-border interaction and co-operation (Ibid.). Akbarzadeh et al. (2019) have 
studied the impact of cross-border contacts and ideals of transnational Kurdish community on 
Kurds in Iran. Their study reveals that the Kurds turn towards their cross-border ethnic kin as 
they are pressed to identify with the Iranian state (Ibid.). Kaczorowski (2020) has research trans-
local ties maintained by Kurds in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul.  
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3. The Kurdish Community in Lebanon 
After Armenians, Kurds constitute the second largest non-Arab ethnic group in Lebanon. By 
the estimate of my informants, between 100,000-150,000 Kurds reside in Lebanon today. An 
accurate figure is not available, as there has been no official censuses in Lebanon since 1932. 
However, prior to 1985, most sources estimated the number of Kurds to be between 60,000 and 
90,000, with more than two-thirds of them living in the capital Beirut2. After thousands of 
Kurdish families had fled the country during the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war, it was believed 
that their number was still in the same range in 2005 (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 3). According 
to my interviewees, thousands of Syrian Kurdish refugees have arrived to Lebanon since the 
breaking of the Syrian conflict in 2011. This has grown the size of the Kurdish community by 
approximately 20,000 Kurds. 
 
Even though Kurdish presence in Lebanon dates back to the early Ottoman centuries, major 
waves of Kurdish immigration took place after the First and the Second World War. In the 
1920s, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were forced out of Northern Kurdistan. Some of them 
settled in the newly established state of Syria, while others headed to the areas of Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Jordan. Lebanon’s proximity to Kurdistan and relatively better living conditions appealed 
to Kurdish migrants. (Meho 2002, 60) In the two decades following the end of the Second 
World War, another major wave of Kurdish migrants flowed to Lebanon. This time a significant 
number of them came from Syria, escaping the poor economic conditions and the cultural and 
political repression. A considerable group of migrants came also from the villages of Mardin 
and its surrounding areas in Turkey. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 1)  
 
Most of the Kurds set up their new home in the low income areas of that time Beirut, such as 
Ain Mreiseh, Basta, Burj al-Barajneh, and Zqaq al-Blat (Ibid. 3). Some of the migrants stayed 
outside the capital in Sidon, Tripoli and Beqaa Valley. During the Lebanese civil war, all the 
Kurds living in Beirut downtown, Furn el-Shubbak and Burj Hammoud were forced to move 
to Dahiye and other areas with large Kurdish concentrations. (Meho 2002, 61-62) Still in 2005, 
most Kurds had meagre socioeconomic means and were considered among the least literate 
communities in Lebanon (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 3-4). 
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The social and political organization of the Kurds was first encouraged by Kamuran Bedirhan, 
who was a prominent advocate of the Kurdish national movement and one of the founders of 
the Khoybun League (Kawtharani & Meho 2005; Tejel 2014). In the 1920-30s Beirut provided 
a safe platform for politically active Iraqi, Turkish and Syrian Kurds to develop and disseminate 
the Kurdish national thought (Kawtharani & Meho 2005). In the 1950-60s Kurds in Lebanon 
established their first parties and associations in order to improve the socioeconomic and 
political status of the community, which was largely influenced by Kurdish leaders in Iraq and 
the presence of politically active Syrian Kurds in Lebanon. Moreover, Beirut served as a 
platform for disseminating Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish national movement in Iraq. (Ibid.) 
The establishment and the agendas of Lebanese Kurdish parties have been largely affected by 
Kurdish national politics and the Kurdish parties outside Lebanon, such as KDP in Iraq and 
KDPS in Syria. So to say, Kurdish politics in Lebanon have always been transnational and the 
community has always been part of transnational Kurdish networks in the Middle East. In the 
following chapters I will present a more detailed overview of the early social and political 
organization of the Kurds in Lebanon.  
 
 
3.1. Kurdish cultural renaissance in exile 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries diverse movements of cultural renaissance emerged in 
the Middle East. Along with other ethnic groups, the Kurdish elite embraced the nationalist 
ideal and established the first Kurdish clubs in Istanbul. However, the First World War and the 
establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 posed major obstacles to the Kurdish movement 
and forced many of its most prominent members into exile. Refusing to face prison or death, 
the Kurdish intellectuals seek refuge in the British mandate of Iraq and in the French mandates 
of Syria and Lebanon. In exile, the Kurdish intellectuals benefited from freedom of speech and 
organization and continued animating the Kurdish cultural renaissance. (Tejel 2014, 839-840, 
846)  
 
It was within this context that Lebanon became a centre of Kurdish cultural movement in the 
1920s. The Kurdish National Committee, Khoybun League, was established in Bhamdoun in 
October 1927, and one of its most prominent members, Kamuran Bedirhan stayed in Lebanon 
for two decades. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 27-28) The Khoybun League conceptualized 
modern Kurdish nationalism in Kurmanji dialect, and was the basis for the widespread doctrine 
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in Turkey and Syria. Furthermore, by creating diplomatic contacts with important state players 
and non-state actors of the region, Khoybun could become an essential regional actor. It 
disseminated Kurdish national propaganda, opened a Kurdish language course in Damascus 
and Kurdish night classes in Beirut, and published the Kurdish literature journals. Moreover, it 
encouraged the creation of various Kurdish committees and associations in northern Syria and 
in larger Levant cities Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut. (Tejel 2014, 846-847)  
 
In Beirut, Kamuran Bedirhan started to broadcast Kurdish radio transmissions in Radio Levant 
in March 1941. He read news in Kurmanji dialect twice a week, and the informative programs 
reached Turkey, giving it real and symbolic importance. (Tejel 2014, 849) Moreover, Bedirhan 
published the weekly “Roja Nu” with Kurdish and French articles in Beirut in 1943-1946. 
(Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 27-28) The revival of Kurdish culture was instrumental in the 
creation of Kurdish national identity. The French authorities in Lebanon were well aware of the 
activities of the Kurdish cultural movement, and granted it a relative liberty, which allowed a 
favourable context to the emergence of a Kurdish culture and Kurdish national movement in 
exile. The Khoybun League was relatively successful in its activities, and within 20 years, the 
movement challenged the primordial attachments among the Kurds by notions of national and 
transnational community. (Tejel 2014, 853-854).  
 
 
3.2. Kurdish national politics in Lebanon 
As an ethnic immigrant group with limited educational and economic resources, Lebanese 
Kurds have struggled to participate in social and political activities. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 
22) Despite the frequent attempts of Kamuran Bedirhan to motivate them to focus on education 
and engage in social and political activities, the majority stayed uninvolved until the 1960s. 
(Ibid. 10) From that on, the Kurdish national politics and parties in Iraq and Syria have had a 
significant impact on the socio-political organization of the Lebanese Kurds.  
 
The year 1958 came with many events that had repercussions on the Kurdish community in 
Lebanon and that eventually motivated them for socio-political organization. Firstly, following 
the establishment of the state union between Egypt and Syria, the first oppressive measures 
were initiated against the Kurds in Syria. Consequently, thousands of Syrian Kurds moved to 
Lebanon, among them politicized students and workers. They had a significant role in raising 
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awareness among the Lebanese Kurds about the objectives of social and political activism. 
Secondly, the Iraqi monarchy fell in 1958, which a few years later lead to the outbreak of the 
1961-1975 Kurdish war. As a home of thousands of Kurds, Beirut could serve as a needed 
publicity platform for the Kurdish national movement in Iraq and its leader, Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 10) Lebanese Kurds disseminated news about the war, 
and accommodated and assisted Kurdish delegates sent by Barzani. (Ibid. 28) These activities 
not only bolstered the national self-awareness of Lebanese Kurds, but also made them consider 
methods to improve their socioeconomic conditions. This finally motivated them to establish 
their first socio-political organizations. (Ibid. 10) 
 
The Kurdish Democratic Party in Lebanon (KDPL), also known as al-Parti, was founded in 
1970 by Jamil Mihhu. It had started to operate clandestinely already ten years before, in July 
1960. The party was established by a group of young Lebanese Kurds, with the assistance of 
the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS). KDPL was regarded as the Lebanese affiliate 
branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq (KDP), which was led by Mustafa Barzani. 
At first, KDPL limited its activities to communication with local Kurds. It disseminated 
statements about the importance education and naturalization as means to improve the social 
and political conditions of the Kurdish community. As of 1961, KDPS encouraged KDPL to 
assist Barzani in the publication of the Kurdish national movement. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 
11) Since then, Lebanese Kurds, especially Kurmanjis, have proclaimed their support to 
Barzani and his successor, Masoud. (Ibid. 28) It was upon Barzani’s call that Mihhu asked the 
Lebanese government to legalize KDPL’s status. The party received license in September 1970. 
Soon after this, however, Mihhu’s popularity among Lebanese Kurds diminished rapidly. In 
consequence, KDPL dismantled into several factions and subdivisions that recreated in 
Lebanon the inner divisions of the Kurdish leadership in Iraq and Syria. (Kawtharani & Meho 
2005, 12) Among these was the Rezgari (Liberty) party established by Faysal Fakhru in 1975 
Meho 2002, 77). By the early 1990s, all of the Lebanese Kurdish political factions were 
disbanded. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 12) 
 
In the mid-1980s, many Lebanese Kurds started to sympathize with the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (PKK). The PKK’s vision of a united Kurdish nation fighting for independence, appealed 
to the Kurds tired of tribal divisions and factionalism that characterized many other Kurdish 
political movements. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 28-29) In the beginning of the 1980s, the 
PKK had a training camp in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, in an area which was under the 
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control of the Syrian army at the time. (Tejel 2009, 76) In the Lebanese civil war, the PKK took 
up arm in solidarity with the Palestinians. (Ibid.) When the leader of the party, Abdullah Öcalan, 
was captured by the Turkish authorities in 1999, the popularity of the PKK deteriorated among 
the Lebanese Kurds. Many also shun the violent means of Öcalan to achieve autonomy and 
were more compelled by the new KDP leader Masud Barzani, who succeeded in the 
reconstruction of Iraqi Kurdistan by more peaceful means. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 28-29) 
Even though the contacts with representatives of Barzani’s KDP in Iraq had virtually ceased 
during the Lebanese civil war, Lebanese Kurds’ symbolic loyalty for Barzani remained 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Eventually the direct interaction between Lebanese Kurdish 
associations and KDP was renewed, as several meetings took place between them in the 
beginning of 2000s. (Ibid. 29-30)  
 
According to Kawtharani & Meho (2005, 20-21), the majority of the Kurds did not participate 
in the activities of the parties. The most of the parties did not emerge out of Lebanese Kurdish 
political consciousness and they did not address the primary concerns of Kurds, such as finding 
jobs and securing food and medical aid. Various times Kurdish national issues (i.e., events in 
Kurdistan) overweighed local ones and strive for improvement of the general status of the 
community in Lebanon was neglected. (Ibid.) The borderlines between Lebanese Kurdish 
parties mostly followed the division between the Kurdish party political in Iraq, Turkey and 
Syria. Kawtharani & Meho (2005, 12) argue that these factions and subdivisions recreated the 
inner divisions of Kurdish leadership in Iraq and Syria. So to say, Kurdish politics in Lebanon 
have always been transnational and the community has always been part of transnational 
Kurdish networks in the Middle East. 
 
In 2019, it was also indicated by my informants that the majority of the Lebanese Kurds would 
not be involved in the activities of the Kurdish political parties. In the time of the writing of my 
thesis it remained unclear, whether any functioning Lebanese Kurdish parties existed. I 
understood from my informants that the KDPL party would have lost its licence within the two 
last years before the interviews in 2019, which implies that the party’s licence would have been 
renewed at some point after 2005. On its website, the KDPL demands the Lebanese authorities 
to lift their ban on the party's political and social activities (KDP Lebanon 2021). In 2019, I was 
also under the impression that the Rezgari party would have ceased its activities and would not 
hold a licence to operate. However, a representative of the party appeared in a short 
documentary made by Rudaw in September 2020 that introduced the general situation of the 
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Lebanese Kurds (Rudaw, September 5, 2020). A month later, an article published by Rudaw 
(October 5, 2020) again mentioned the Rezgari party in a way that implied some activity. An 
article published in 2007 in the news site of Hezbollah (Moqawama, November 7, 2007) 
suggests that the Rezgari party would have allied with the Shiite group, which also implies the 
continuation of some activity after 2005. 
 
 
3.3. Kurds in the Lebanese political system 
Unlike the Armenians, who are officially recognized as a distinct ethnic and religious group, 
Lebanese Kurds do not hold any special status on the base of their ethnicity. In the Lebanese 
sectarian political system, Kurds are counted by their religion as Sunnis. (Meho 2002, 61) 
However, Kurds have several times expressed their will to have an own ethnicity-based 
representation at the Lebanese parliament and at the municipality of Beirut (Kawtharani & 
Meho 2005, 25-26). Also all of my Lebanese Kurdish interviewees raised up the topic and had 
been working on the issue on a way or another. One of them had been running as a candidate 
in the last parliamentary elections in 2018, and another one had made appeals to the Lebanese 
president in the early 2000s. According to Hourani (2011, 80), Lebanese Kurds can muster 
around 27,000 votes in Lebanon, out of which 18,700 in Beirut. 
 
Until 1994, the majority of the Kurds did not have a Lebanese citizenship, which hindered the 
socioeconomic development and the political participation of the community (Meho 2002, 62). 
In order to maintain the confessional hegemony obtained in the 1932 census, Lebanese 
Christians strongly opposed granting citizenship to Sunni Kurds (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 3-
5). In the early 1960s, Kurds appealed to the Minister of Interior, Kamal Jumblatt, on the 
citizenship issue. He provided them with “under study” identification cards, which allowed 
them to travel in and out of Lebanon. After the end of the Lebanese civil war in the 1990s, 
Kurds sought to the most powerful Sunni leader in the country, the new Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri. In 1994, his government issued a naturalization decree that settled the legal status of all 
qualified non-naturalized individuals in Lebanon. As a result, around 18,000 noncitizen Kurds 
obtained citizenship. (Ibid. 6-8)  
 
After the promulgation of their naturalization, Kurds considered Hariri as their champion. In 
the 1996 and 2000 parliamentary elections more than half of the 15,000 Kurdish voters in Beirut 
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voted for Hariri and his associates. However, Kurds gained very little in return for their support. 
The aides of Hariri validated this by the inability of the Kurdish associations to choose one 
representative leader for the community. As Kurds were subdivided into several antagonistic 
groups, they were unable to agree over the person. In the absence of alternative choice of 
patronage, Kurds have remained loyal to Hariri’s leadership. (Kawtharani & Meho 2005, 25-
27)  
 
In 2011, it was estimated by Hourani (2011, 90-91) that 90 percent of the Kurds would be 
supporters of the Future Movement, while the remaining 10 percent would be with the Al 
Ahbash movement, a politically active pan-Sufi organization. In 2019, some of my interviewees 
indicated that the majority of the Lebanese Kurds would be supporters of Hariri’s Future 
Movement. From 2016 to 2020, Saad Hariri was on his second term as the Prime Minister of 
Lebanon. However, the study of Hourani (2011, 86) revealed that only 8 percent of the 
Lebanese Kurds considered the Hariri’s parliamentary bloc to represent them, while 92 percent 
had considered themselves unpresented in the Lebanese Parliament. Hourani’s (2011) study on 
the political participation of the Kurds after the naturalization has revealed that the number of 
Kurdish participation in the parliamentarian and municipal elections has been steadily 
increasing since 1996. Up to 94 percent of the naturalized Kurds casted their vote in the 
municipal elections in 2010. (Ibid. 83) 
 
 
3.4. Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lebanon post-2011 
While Lebanon hosts more than one million Syrian refugees, there is no official number for the 
Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lebanon. In July 2019, it was estimated by my interviewees that 
approximately 20,000 Syrian Kurdish refugees have come to Lebanon since the outbreak of the 
Syrian conflict in 2011, especially after the ISIS attack on Kobane in 2016 and Turkey’s capture 
of Afrin in 2018. In 2014, it was written in the Iraqi Kurdish news outlet Rudaw that “many 
thousands of Kurds fled the violence in Syria and went to Lebanon” (Neurink 2014). Accoding 
to the article, the Syrian Kurds came from all over Syria: Damascus, Aleppo, Hasaka and 
Qamishli (Ibid).  In 2016, the Lebanese newspaper Daily Star mentioned that numerous Kurds 
had sought refuge from the threat of ISIS in northern Syria and resided in Beirut’s Basta 
neighbourhood, which has had a considerable Kurdish population already for nearly half a 
century (Nashed 2016). My informants suggested the majority of the Syrian Kurds to reside in 
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the Armenian quarters of Burj Hammoud in Beirut, and mentioned many of them to be from 
Afrin. According to them, Lebanon has been only a temporary stop for many of the Syrian 
Kurds on their way to Turkey and Europe. 
 
Both the Rudaw (Neurink 2014) and the Daily Star (Nashed 2016) articles described the 
hardship that the Syrian Kurds had faced in Lebanon and their disappointment to the little help 
they have received from the local Kurdish community. Also the unaffiliated Syrian Kurd I 
interviewed stated that the Lebanese Kurds have not helped the exiled Syrian Kurds. Yet, the 
presidents of all the Lebanese Kurdish associations described the relationship between the 
Lebanese Kurds and the refugees to be good, and for example mentioned that many Lebanese 
Kurds have married with Syrians. The president of the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic 
Association stated that they do not differentiate between Kurds coming from different 
geographical areas and they help the Syrian Kurds in what they can, but the Kurds in Lebanon 
do not have much resources nor leverage. The president of the Newroz Association suggested 
that the Syrian Kurds have been curious to get to know the Kurds in Lebanon, and many of 
them have the participated in the events and activities of the association. It was suggested by 
my interviewees that Syrian Kurds might be socially and politically more active and organized 
than the Lebanese Kurds. Reportedly, many Syrian Kurds have taken part in the demonstrations 
in Beirut.   
24 
 
4. Rojava and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria 
Rojava is the Kurdish name for the areas in northern Syria, where Kurds are concentrated, i.e. 
the Jazirah region, Kobani and Afrin regions. In my thesis, when I use the term “Rojava”, 
“Kurdish areas in Syria” or “northern Syria”, I refer to these areas. Although the Kurds form 
the majority in northern Syria, Rojava is a multicultural and multi-religious area. It is home to 
e.g. Syriac Christians, Assyrian Christians, Armenian Christians, Yazidis, Turkmen and 
Chechens Arabs (Rojava Information Centre 2021).  
 
Since 2014, a de facto self-administration governance has been operating in the area. The 
political system is based on the ideology of democratic confederalism developed by Abdullah 
Öcalan, the  imprisoned  leader  of  the  Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and has provoked 
many argumentations for and against. Some see it as a revolution with a potential to alleviate 
ethnic and religious tensions in the Middle East, whereas others criticize it for being another 
non-democratic and suppressive system. Öcalan presents the model as means for peaceful co-
existence in multi-ethnic and religious societies of the Middle East, and proposes it as a solution 
to the Kurdish question. The three main pillars of democratic confederalism are the 




4.1. Development of the administration 
After the breakout of the Syrian crisis, the Syrian central government gave up its local authority 
and withdrew from the Kurdish areas in summer 2012. Following this, the Kurdish YPG-forces 
took control of the cities of Kobane, Amuda, Afrin and Qamishli. (Jongerden 2019, 64), and 
the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) became the dominant political force in the area 
(Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 62). The party initiated a process of self-administration, on the 
basis of developing a network of interconnected and self-administrated villages, 
neighbourhoods, cities and regions (Jongerden 2019, 65).  In January 2014, Jazirah, Kobane 
and Afrin cantons officially declared democratic autonomy through a provisional constitution 
(Dinc 2020, 51). Later the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 
led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), took control of more areas from ISIS and 
other armed groups in northeast Syria (Ibid.). In 2015, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) 
was created to represent the political parties and organizations in north and east Syria. It is the 
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political body to which the SDF reports (Rojava Information Centre 2021), and it was active in 
forming administrative councils and governing in non-Kurdish majority areas liberated by the 
SDF (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 96). In March 2016, the establishment the “Democratic 
Federation of Rojava Northern Syria” was declared in the areas under the SDC control. In 
September 2018, it was renamed as the “Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria” 
(NES). (Jongerden 2019, 64) Nevertheless, Rojava is still commonly used to refer to the region 
(Rojava Information Centre 2021). 
  
The Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) is the coordinating platform of political 
parties, professional and societal organisations, and different council representatives in NES 
(Jongerden 2019, 70). TEV-DEM is represented in the SDC, the executive body of the Federal 
Northern Syria, and its organization and structures span and connect all the administrative 
regions of NES (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 96). The PYD party was the prime mover in the 
formation of TEV-DEM and in positioning it as the driving force of the administration. (Ibid. 
64).  For many, the distinction between TEV-DEM and the PYD has remained vague (Ibid. 95). 
TEV-DEM was an essential actor in the driving of the social revolution in Rojava, which 
conformed the radical political agenda of the PYD (Ibid. 96). The PYD itself was established 
in 2003, and originally it operated within the PKK’s umbrella organization, the Kurdistan 
Communities Union (KCK). Until 2015, the PYD’s internal code recognized Kongra-Gel, the 
highest legislative and representative body of the KCK, as its supreme legislative authority and 
Abdullah Öcalan as the leader of the party. The amendments made in 2015 removed these 
statements and named TEV-DEM as its official representative body, but nevertheless left a 
recognition of Öcalan as the ideological inspiration of the PYD. (Ibid. 61-62)  
 
The PYD drifted into a conflict with the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a Syrian umbrella 
organisation of pro-KRG Kurdish parties (Jongerden 2019, 65). The KNC was led by the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS), the Syrian affiliate of Iraq’s Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, headed by President Masoud Barzani. Barzani had strong connections to the 
KNC, and had helped to establish it in October 2011. (Federici & Sayigh 2012) The motive of 
the PYD to develop an administration based on the idea of autonomous assemblies conflicted 
with the KNC’s aim to establish a similar kind of autonomy for the Kurds in Syria as in the 
KRG in Iraq. The conflict between the PYD and the KNC coincided with the prevalent crisis 
within the Kurdish party political system. (Jongerden 2019, 65) In 2012, the spread of the YPG 
checkpoints in northern Syria inflicted tensions between the parties. The PYD prevented other 
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Kurdish parties from setting up their own small armed units, and many KNC activists were 
arrested by PYD security personnel. The July 2012 Erbil agreement and the establishment of 
the Supreme Kurdish Committee (SKC) to jointly administer the Kurdish areas did not manage 
to overcome the deep-rooted differences and inequalities between the opponents. (Allsopp & 
Wilgenburg 2019, 91-92) Like the Assad regime and the wider Syrian opposition, the KNC 
denounced the PYD declaration of federal governance in northern Syria in March 2016 (Ibid. 
83).  
 
In an interview given in December 2016, President Assad described the federal structures 
created by the Kurds in northern Syria as temporary (ARA News, December 9, 2016). He stated 
that he Syrian constitution does not allow for federalism, but that resolving the political 
situation in the north would have to wait till the end of the Syrian conflict (Ibid.). The regime 
had done little to prevent the PYD takeover of the Kurdish areas, which led the Syrian 
opposition and the Kurdish opponents of the PYD to accuse the party of connivance of the 
regime (Allsopp 2015, 217). The PYD and the SDC did not aim to constructing a new state or 
replacing Assad. The principle issue for them was the change of the political system to a more 
democratic one, a self-government in a form of non-statist democracy, which conflicted with 
Assad’s and the opposition’s objective of centralised state rule. (Jongerden 2019, 64) In 
December 2016, Salih Muslim, the co-chair of the PYD party, stated in an interview that the 
Kurdish parties do not want to divide Syria and have no interests in fighting Damascus (ARA 
News, December 9, 2016). He said that the project of creation a democratic federal 
decentralized Syria is for all of the country, and the party is ready to discuss the issue with 
everyone: the Alawites, Druze, Sunnis, and others (Ibid.) 
 
 
4.2. The Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava  
The PYD-led administration enforced regulation and largely encouraged social change in the 
area of women’s rights and representation in society and politics. Since 2012, a co-chair system 
has been implemented, and every position in the administration has to be co-chaired by a man 
and a woman. Furthermore, women have obtained a 40 percent quota in every council, and 
women’s associations have been established in every commune. (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 
78) In 2016, the new Social Contract guaranteed the women’s freedom and rights and equal 
presentation of the genders, including the co-presidency (articles 12, 13 and 14). It also 
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prescribed violence and discrimination against women as a crime and women’s right to take 
decisions relevant to their affairs (articles 25 and 26). (Social Contract 2016) Laws have been 
imposed to ban child marriage, forced marriage, polygamy and dowry, and honour murders 
have been criminalized (Barkhoda 2016, 83). Academies and educational centres for women, 
where Jineology, the Kurdish “women’s science”, is taught, have been established (Ferreira & 
Santiago 2018, 496).  
 
The Congress Star (Kongreya Star) is the umbrella women’s movement in Rojava. It was 
founded in 2005 under the name of the Star Union (Yekîtiya Star), and was renamed in February 
2016. Under the Ba’ath regime, the activists of the movement were arrested and tortured. 
Nowadays, all the women who are involved in TEV-DEM’s social, political, and military work 
are also members of the Congress Star. (Knapp et al. 2016, 60) Through its networks, the 
Congress Star aims to organize efforts for empowering women in society and to bring women 
from every segment into the public sphere (Barkhoda 2016, 83). The Congress Star is 
represented in the executive body of TEV-DEM, along with the PYD and other organizations. 
(Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 95)  
 
The Congress Star follows Öcalan’s ideology on democratic confederalism and women’s 
empowerment. The brochure of the organization states that “the women of the Star Congress 
have worked in line with the leader Abdullah Ocalan’s principles, and believe in his philosophy 
and ideology about women’s freedom in society” (Congress Star 2018, 16). The Congress Star 
includes women of all ethnicities and religions (Ibid. 7). The organization aims to “develop a 
free Rojava, a democratic Syria, and a democratic Middle East by promoting women’s freedom 
and the concept of the democratic nation”. Moreover, it “takes the development of a revolution 
in women’s freedom throughout the Middle East as its basic goal, predicated on the 
development of such a revolution in Rojava and Syria”. (Ibid. 8) The brochure highlights that 
the Diplomatic Relations Committee of the Congress Star has participated in several 
international forums around the world. Moreover, foreign delegations and women’s 
organizations have visited the organization to learn about the Kurdish women’s struggle in 
Rojava and mechanisms of women’s self-organization. (Ibid. 17) 
 
According to Allsopp & Wilgenburg (2019, 79), women always been present in the Kurdish 
political movement in Syria, and the political programmes of all Kurdish political parties have 
included provisions about women’s rights. Notwithstanding, the leadership of the KNC parties 
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have traditionally been dominated by men, and the wide statements about equality have not 
been elaborated. In comparison, the PYD party and its administration have had significantly 
more female leaders. Surveys conducted in Syria in 2016 indicated that women’s rights was 




4.3. Turkey’s military involvement in northern Syria 
For Turkey, the Kurdish seizure of control over northern Syria presented a problem and a 
domestic security threat rising from its own Kurdish issue and unresolved conflict with the 
PKK. It feared that a contiguous PYD controlled territory, encompassing its southern border 
with Syria would provide a haven for the PKK. (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 174) Despite the 
denial of connections to the PKK by the PYD, Turkey claimed the opposite and has seen the 
party as synonymous with the PKK. Turkey declared it would it would intervene against any 
attempt of the PKK to establish permanent presence in northern Syria. (Allsopp 2015, 218) 
Until 2019, US dependence on the SDF in the anti-ISIS operation provided some protection for 
the PYD against the Turkish threats (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 178). 
 
Turkey’s primary agenda in its involvement in Syria has been disrupting PYD ambitions and 
hindering the party from achieving territorial contiguity and weakening its prospects for a post-
war settlement. Turkey conducted military interventions in Jarablus in August 2016 and in Afrin 
in 2018. (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 175) In October 2019, Turkey launched an offensive to 
create a “safe zone” in northern Syria (BBC, October 14, 2019). The 2016 offensive officially 
aimed at capturing the border town of Jarablus from ISIS and removing “terror groups” from 
the border. However, Turkey’s more important objective was to prevent the PYD from 
connecting the Kobani and Afrin cantons. (Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 177) In March 2018, 
Turkish-backed Syrian rebels took control of the Kurdish-majority city Afrin after a two month 
operation (Guardian, March 18, 2018). According to president Erdogan, the 2019 offensive 
aimed to “prevent the creation of a terror corridor” in northern Syria and it was launched amid 
the US troops withdrawal from the region (BBC October 14, 2019). Politically, Turkey has tried 
to keep the PYD isolated from wider negotiations on Syria’s future on regional and international 
level and to prevent the international recognition of the PYD-led autonomous administration. 
(Allsopp & Wilgenburg 2019, 178)  
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5. Methods and material 
My research is a qualitative study conducted in the method of the semi-structured interview 
format. I carried out five interviews on my field trip in Beirut in July 2019, four of which were 
done with the presidents of Lebanese Kurdish associations and one with an unaffiliated Syrian 
Kurd. I recorded each of the interviews and later transcribed them for analysis. I have used 
thematic content analysis as the method to examine the textual data composed of the transcripts. 
In this chapter, I will first reflect on the sampling in Beirut, the semi-structured interview format 
and the process of developing an interview guide, and the structure of the interviews. After that, 
I will provide short descriptions of the associations I visited. Finally, I will discuss the 
transcription process, the principles of thematic content analysis, and reflect on research ethics. 
 
 
5.1. Sampling and informants 
I decided to interview the leaders of Lebanese Kurdish associations because I presumed it to be 
easier to contact them instead of trying to randomly find Kurdish people on the streets of Beirut. 
I also thought that it would be more likely for them to know English and to be involved in social 
and political activism. What is more, I had read about the challenges of the research team of 
Dr. Hourani had had in building contact with Kurdish respondents to participate in their 
questionnaire on the streets (see Hourani 2011). Before starting my interviews, I had met Dr. 
Hourani by coincidence at a seminar organized by the Finnish Institute in the Middle East in 
Beirut in May 2019. She gave me the contact information of my first informants, and later I 
received more contacts through a snowball effect from the interviewees. The unaffiliated Syrian 
Kurd was a friend of my Syrian friend in Finland, so the contact was arranged through him. I 
began creating my networks with the Lebanese Kurdish association in June 2019 and conducted 
the official interviews in July 2019.  
  
In the time of the writing of this thesis, it remains unclear whether there are any functioning 
Lebanese Kurdish parties at present. In 2019, I had understood from my informants that the 
parties had run out of resources and that the KDPL party would have lost its license within the 
two last years before the interviews. This implies that the party’s license would have been 
renewed at some point after 2005. I tried to contact the KDPL party via email without a 
response. In 2019, I was also under the impression that the Rezgari party would have ceased its 




Due to the impression that there were not any functioning Lebanese Kurdish political parties in 
July 2019, I ended up selecting only representatives of Lebanese Kurdish social and cultural 
associations for sampling. The associations whose presidents took part in the research were the 
Newroz Social and Cultural Association, the Lebanese Kurdish Association of Ain Mreiseh and 
Mina el Hosn, the Jin Women’s Association, and the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic 
Association. I was supposed to have one more interview with the representative of a Lebanese 
Kurdish association outside Beirut, but it got canceled at the last minute due to the interviewee’s 
family reasons. Short descriptions of the aforementioned associations can be found below: 
 
Newroz Social and Cultural Association was established in 2014 by a group of Lebanese 
Kurdish women. In addition to cultural activities, the association organizes trainings for 
women. The association has between 200-300 members, and its current president is Hanan 
Osman. The association tries to change the views of Lebanese people on Kurds, since it is often 
thought that Kurds are not educated and not capable to participate in politics. Osman herself 
was running as a candidate in the communal elections in Beirut in 2018. The Newroz 
Association is part of the women’s organization platform maintained by the Jin Women’s 
Association. 
 
The Lebanese Kurdish Association of Ain Mreiseh and Mina el Hosn was established in 
1997 to help poor Kurds with e.g. health care and school fees. However, the association has 
recently struggled to meet sufficient economic resources. The association has 60-70 members, 
and its current president is Nasser Meho.  
 
Jin Women’s Association was established in summer 2019. According to its president Bushra 
Ali, the association aims to create a platform to incorporate different women’s associations in 
the Middle East. Through the network the association aims to empower women, and the 
women’s rights issue is important for the association. Ali is originally from northern Syria, but 
before coming to Lebanon she was working on the women’s issue in a similar kind of 
association in Iraqi Kurdistan. Besides Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan, the association has contacts 
with other women’s organizations in Turkey, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East and the 




The Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association, established in 1963, was the first Kurdish 
association in Lebanon. The aim of the association is to help poor Kurds and to maintain 
Kurdish language and culture. The association has a small clinic that offers free health care, 
and it organizes a Newroz celebration every year. Moreover, it organizes Kurdish language 
teaching for the Kurdish youth. The association has contact with a few Kurdish associations of 
Lebanese origin in Germany and Sweden.  
 
Anonymous The last person I interviewed was a Syrian Kurd living in Beirut. He moved to 
Lebanon 20 years ago from northern Syria. Until 2012, he used to visit his hometown in Syria 
twice a year. The interviewee is not a member of any of the Kurdish associations in Lebanon. I 
hoped that the discussion with him would help me to understand the general situation of the 
Kurds in Lebanon and Syria and bring a different perspective to my research. 
 
 
5.2. Interview format and structure 
In a qualitative study, the quality and trustworthiness of the research, as well as the results, are 
vastly influenced by rigorous data collection procedures. Interviews are the most commonly 
used data collection method in qualitative research, and the most frequently used interview 
technique is the semi-structured format. Its advantage is the ability to create reciprocity between 
the interviewer and the participant, and allowing space for the interviewer to improvise follow-
up questions based on the responses of each participant. Furthermore, the semi-structured 
format caters to the individual verbal expressions of the interviewees. In semi-structured 
interviews, the questions are collected in an interview guide, and they should cover the main 
themes of the study. The guide is meant to offer s focused structure for the discussion and not 
to be strictly followed. (Kallio et al. 2016, 2955)  
 
In semi-structured interviews, well-formulated questions are participant-oriented but not 
leading, clearly worded, single-faceted, and open ended. Follow-up questions can be pre-
designed or spontaneous. (Ibid. 2959-2960) Developing a rigorous semi-structured interview 
guide contributes positively to the trustworthiness of qualitative research in multiple ways: it 
enhances the credibility, confirmability and dependability of the study. Confirmability and 
dependability can also be enhanced by presenting the complete interview guide in the study 
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report, as it makes the research process as transparent as possible describes the way the data 
was collected. (Ibid. 2962-2963) 
 
My interview guide was divided into three themes: theme A on background information about 
the association, theme B on the situation of Kurds in Lebanon, and theme C on their positions 
on activism and networks related to Rojava. The questions of theme C were the most relevant 
and important ones to my research. However, in order to grasp the situation of Lebanese Kurds 
and to understand the context better, I considered it necessary to ask background questions 
about the association and the circumstances of the Lebanese Kurds. I contemplated that in order 
to understand Lebanese Kurds’ networks and transnational activism related to northern Syria, I 
should first know the general up-to-date context of the Kurds in Lebanon. As the relevant 
academic literature on Lebanese Kurds was little and not up to date, this kind of background 
information was needed. So, in the theme A, I asked about the establishment of the association, 
its purpose, members and activities, and its networks in Lebanon and abroad. In the theme B, I 
asked the participants about the general situation of Kurds in Lebanon, their number, their 
origin, their political activism, and the number of Syrian Kurdish refugees. The questions of the 
theme C aimed at finding out that what kind of transnational activism and networks Lebanese 
Kurds have in relation to Rojava. So for example, I made inquiries about the association’s 
relations to Rojava, their activities regarding the issue, and whether they try to influence the 
issue or not. The original interview guide was made in English, but I had translated the questions 
also into Arabic in my notebook, which was with me during the meetings. The full interview 
guide is viewable in the appendix B. 
 
Although I followed the interview guide during the interviews, I did not let it bind the 
conversations. I wanted to give space for the participants to discuss the matters they find the 
most relevant related to the topic. I thought that there might be some important dimensions on 
the matter that I did not realize to inquire. I asked a lot of spontaneous sub-questions to clarify 
the statements of the participants. Even though sometimes the conversations were meandering 
a lot, the interview guide gave an essential framework for the interviews, and ensured that the 
same basic questions were discussed with each of the participants. 
 
The interviews lasted from half an hour up to one hour and a half. One of the interviews was 
done completely in English, one in Arabic, two of them half-English half-Arabic and one with 
a translator from English to Kurdish. During two of the interviews, the language varied between 
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English and Arabic depending on which language it was the easiest for the interviewee to 
understand and to response in. One of my informants translated the interview from Kurdish to 
English with another association leader she arranged me a meeting with. As I do not speak 
Kurdish, so I had to trust my interviewee for the right translation of the interview. However, 
these two participants have parallel standpoints to Rojava and they are part of same women’s 
organization networks, which reduces the motive to alter the translation. 
 
 
5.3. On transcription 
Transcription is the way of transferring spoken language to the written word, where different 
set of rules of language apply. It brings uninterrupted oral language into a static form of 
representation, which is necessary for the management and organization of data, since only 
written language can be sorted, copied, examined and quoted. Naturalized transcription and 
denaturalized transcription are the two main methods of transcription, where the former is a 
detailed and less filtered transcription, and the latter more flowing and laundered. Naturalized 
transcription focuses on the details of the discourse, and records in the textual data breaks in 
the speech, laughter, mumbling, gestures and involuntary sounds etc. Denaturalized 
transcription removes socio-cultural characteristics of the data, which in some cases could be 
useful for the study. It describes the discourse and the essence of the interview accurately, but 
limits description of accent or involuntary sounds and gestures. (Mero-Jaffe 2011, 232) 
 
In my transcription, I have mostly applied the denaturalized transcription method, yet in some 
units I have noted gestures, laughter or other sounds if I considered it to provide useful 
information for assessment of the discourse. I transcribed the interviews in the language in 
which the discussion was flowing. Consequently, a few of the interviews are transcribed partly 
in English and partly in Arabic, and a couple of them entirely in English or Arabic. The 
interview that was translated from Kurdish to English is transcribed in English only. To make 
the typing on faster, I initially transcribed the Arabic speech in Latin alphabet.  
 
 
5.4. Thematic content analysis 
Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) is a descriptive presentation of qualitative data, such as 
interview transcripts. According to Burnard (1991, 461) TCA assumes that semi-structured or 
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open ended interviews have been carried out, recorded and transcribed in full. The method is 
used to categorize and codify the interview transcripts, and it is carried out in stages.  TCA is 
utilized to portray the thematic content of interview transcripts through identification of 
common themes in the textual data. According to Anderson (2007, 1) TCA is the most 
foundational of qualitative analytic procedures and informs all qualitative methods in some 
way. TCA has been developed from Glaser and Strauss’ grounded theory, content analysis and 
other means of analysing qualitative data (Burnard 1991, 461). In TCA, the researcher’s 
epistemological stance is objective or objectivistic (Anderson 2007, 1).  
 
In short in TCA, the researcher groups the textual data in several stages, and employs names 
for common themes found in the transcribed interview material i.e. the actual words of the 
interviewee. Even though sorting and naming themes requires interpretation of some kind, it 
should be kept to minimum (Anderson 2007, 1). In order to conduct TCA, the researcher first 
gets immersed in the data by reading through the material, and by freely creating and marking 
categories for themes and distinct units of meaning found in the text. This first stage of analysis 
is known as “open coding”. The researcher should highlight all relevant descriptions to the topic 
of inquiry from “dross”, which refers to unusable fillers in an interview. In the next stage, the 
researcher surveys the categories and groups some of them together in order to create higher-
order headings and to reduce the number of categories. In the following stage, the categories 
and sub-headings are again processed to remove repetitious or similar headings, and to create a 
new and final list of categories. (Burnard 1991, 462-463) 
 
After that the researcher re-reads the transcript with the final list of categories and sub-headings 
to survey whether they cover all aspects of the interviews or not. Adjustments are made 
accordingly. Each interview transcript is worked through in the similar way, coding and 
creating list of categories and sub-headings. If needed, categories can be collapsed or 
subdivided. Eventually, after completing the TCA of every interview, the categories of all 
interview transcripts are combined. Each coded unit of the interviews is cut out and all the items 
of each code are piled together, and pasted onto sheets with appropriate heading and sub-
headings. Multiple copies of the transcript ensure that the context of the coded sections is not 
lost, and complete transcripts should be kept for reference during all the process. All the 
sections should be filed together for writing up the findings. If anything seems unclear at the 
writing up stage, the researcher refers back to the complete transcripts and original recordings. 
Finally, at the writing up stage the researcher selects various examples of data of each section 
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and links the examples together with a commentary and possible literature. (Burnard 1991, 463-
464; Anderson 2007, 2-3) 
 
Burnard (1991, 465) notes that one of the difficulties of qualitative research and TCA is to find 
a method to present research findings in an honest and reliable way. He points out that the only 
way to present the findings without any interpretation or bias would be to offer the complete 
transcripts unanalysed. Clearly this would not be practical to the reader, who would have to 
then find out his own way to categorize the text. However, Burnard (ibid.) suggests that TCA 
stays close to the original material and allows the reader to make sense of the data presented.  
 
 
5.5. Research ethics 
Research ethics determines how the people subjected in a research should be treated and how 
the data obtained from them should be dealt with. The most common principles of research 
ethics are: minimizing the harm caused for the research subjects, respecting their autonomy, 
and preserving their privacy. The procedure of informed consent is frequently used to meet the 
requirements of ethical research. (Traianou 2014, 62) Regarding the data it is important to 
consider if it is private or secret, and in which manner the findings are reported. Confidentiality 
and anonymization are often used precautionary principles to protect the data and people. 
Details that allow the people to be identified may be omitted, such as personal characteristics 
or contextual features of places. (Traianou 2014, 64-66) 
 
In my research, I have taken the principles of minimizing the harm, respecting people’s 
autonomy and preserving their privacy into account by filling up a consent form with each of 
the participants before starting the interview with them. I have also shortly explained them the 
topic and the purpose of the research. I have asked for permission to record the interview and 
for the consent of the participant to publish their name and possibly quotations in the thesis, 
and I let them choose to review the direct quotations before publishing.  
 
Before starting the interviews, I was not sure whether the participants could find Rojava and 
activism related to it as a sensitive topic or whether taking part in the research could result in 
harm for them. To prevent any potential harm and distress, I addressed my interviewees that 
they are free not to answer the questions, if they wish so. That way I could respect their 
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autonomy in making decisions about possible risks. Apart from one, all the participants 
expressed their consent on publishing their name along with my thesis, namely all the presidents 
of the Lebanese Kurdish associations. The one Syrian Kurd unaffiliated with any of the 
associations wished to stay anonymous, hence I will not disclose his identity. All the data not 
published in the thesis, including the interview recordings and transcripts, are dealt with 





In my research, I aim to examine the transnational activism and networks of Lebanese Kurds 
in relation to Rojava. The primary material of my study is based on the interviews conducted 
with the leaders of four Lebanese Kurdish associations (the Newroz Association, the Lebanese 
Kurdish Association of Ain Mreiseh and Mina el Hosn, the Jin Women’s Association, and the 
Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association) and one unaffiliated Syrian Kurd in Beirut in 
summer 2019. In the analysis, I utilize the theoretical framework of transnational activism, 
transnational networks, and processes of transnational contention. In the previous chapters, I 
have contextualized the findings by presenting an overview of the history of the Kurds in 
Lebanon, the recent political developments in the Kurdish areas of northern Syria, the Kurdish 
women’s movement in Rojava, and media coverage regarding the Kurds in Lebanon. The 
extensive contextualization has been essential in the comprehension of the material and the 
transnational processes that occur between Lebanese Kurds and Rojava. 
  
According to all of the association leaders, their association does neither carry out political 
activism nor particular activities around the Rojava issue nor try to influence it directly. The 
Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s Association conduct grassroots women’s activism, 
which could be interpreted as political, even though the interviewees themselves did not count 
it as such (on grassroots civic activism, see above 2.3.). Even though Lebanese Kurds have been 
able to demonstrate in solidarity with the Syrian Kurds against the Turkish interventions in 
northern Syria, the poor political opportunities of the Kurdish community in Lebanon weakens 
their opportunities to influence the Rojava issue through transnational activism. However, I 
discovered that the political transformations and the so-called social revolution in northern 
Syria have influenced the thinking and forms of action of some of the Kurds. Thus, I argue that 
the relationship between Rojava and the Lebanese Kurds is reciprocal.  
  
I observed that the attitudes of the association leaders towards Rojava largely depended on the 
political faction they favored in the Kurdish party political system. While the interviewees 
critical towards the actions of the PYD-led administration in NES did not have association level 
contacts to Rojava, the interviewees who sympathized with the political ideology of Abdullah 
Öcalan and the PYD-led administration had contacts with their association to northern Syria. 
Although the sympathizers of Öcalan claimed that they do not directly aim to influence the 
issue, their grassroots women’s activism was largely influenced and inspired by the Kurdish 
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women’s movement in Rojava. These two associations, namely the Newroz Association and 
the Jin Women’s Association, had relations with the Congress Star, the umbrella women’s 
organization in northern Syria. It could be drawn that they formed transnational coalitions with 
the Congress Star, and they were part of larger transnational women’s rights advocacy networks 
through their local activism (on transnational advocacy networks, see above 2.3.). The 
inspiration and influences they took from the Congress Star could be seen as a form of diffusion 
(on diffusion, see above 2.4.), and they framed the Rojava issue in a similar way through human 
and women’s rights discourse. Additionally, I found out that some political leaders from Rojava 
had come to Beirut to seek support from Lebanese politicians, which can be seen as a feature 
of externalization of the conflict by the administration in NES (on externalization, see above 
2.4.).  
  
In the following chapters, I will present the research findings in more detail. First, I shall discuss 
the poor political opportunities of the Lebanese Kurds and the division of the community 
between different political factions. In the last chapter and its sub-chapters, I will discuss the 
transnational processes that occurred between some of the Lebanese Kurds and Rojava. 
 
 
6.1. Political opportunities of the Kurds in Lebanon 
“Political? We don’t have political.” “What can we do? We cannot do anything.” These were 
the responses of some of my interviewees to the question about the aims of their association to 
influence the Rojava issue. The political opportunity structure can be a helpful tool to 
understand the political landscape of Lebanese Kurds better, and it can be useful to explain why 
I did not find such activism oriented to support the Rojava issue as I expected (on political 
opportunity structure, see above 2.4.). As mentioned in chapter three, Lebanese Kurds have 
struggled to take part in politics, and most of them are not politically active. My interviewees 
confirmed this to be the case also at present. When analyzed through the major dimensions of 
the political opportunity structure (see above 2.4.), the political opportunities of the Lebanese 
Kurds can be seen as very narrow. The formation of their collective action has been discouraged 
by the state. The Lebanese Kurds do not have an ethnic-based representative at the parliament, 
even though they have strived for that since the 1990s. They also lack access to influential 
allies, as the Hariri family, whom the majority of the Kurds have considered as their patron, has 
not provided them with the political and socio-economical resources they have demanded (on 
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Kurds and Hariri, see above 3.3.). Moreover, it seems that the Kurds do not have licensed 
political parties in Lebanon at present, as the Lebanese government has not renewed the license 
of the KDPL for some years (on the ban of KDPL, see above 5.1.). Furthermore, it was stated 
by my interviewees that Syrian Kurds would get arrested if they tried to carry out any political 
activism in Lebanon.  
  
The lack of political opportunities is evident in the association leaders’ answers regarding 
attempts to influence the situation in northern Syria. They suggested that besides sharing news 
and demonstrating, Lebanese Kurds do not have chances to influence, but they try to help the 
Syrian Kurdish refugees with their needs in the realms of their capabilities. All of my Lebanese 
Kurdish interviewees raised up the topic of having an own ethnic-based representative in the 
Lebanese parliament, and they had been working on the issue in a way or another. One of them 
had been running as a candidate in the last parliamentary elections in 2018, and another one 
had made appeals to the Lebanese president in the early 2000s. Their strive for a Kurdish 
representative can be seen as a form of immigrant politics (on immigrant politics, see above 
2.5.). The Kurds believe that having a Kurdish representative could better their socio-economic 
opportunities in Lebanon.  
  
The political factionalism related to Kurdish party political has also weakened the Lebanese 
Kurds’ political possibilities of influence. As it was mentioned in chapter 2.5, homeland 
political orientation may serve to disempowerment of ethnic diasporas and may lead to non-
presentation in the institutions of the host country and weaken representation in immigrant 
political fora. Representatives of different political, ethnic, or religious factions may be pressed 
to cooperate. Kawtharani & Meho (2005, 20-21) have demonstrated this to be the case with 
Lebanese Kurds (see above 3.3.). In the next chapter, I will discuss the features of political 
factionalism that I observed among the Lebanese Kurds. 
 
 
6.2. Division between different political factions 
Although in July 2019, it seemed that there were no officially recognized Kurdish political 
parties functioning in Lebanon, the division between the different Kurdish political factions, 
namely the sympathizers of the KRG president Barzani and the PKK leader Öcalan, was 
prevalent in the responses of the participants. The Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s 
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Association shared ideological affinity with Öcalan, while the Lebanese Kurdish Association 
of Ain Mreisse and Mina el Hosn and the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association did not 
affiliate with it. This standpoint to Kurdish party political was projected on the attitudes of the 
association leaders towards Rojava and activism related to it. The conflict between the PYD 
party and the pro-KRG umbrella KNC in NES (see above 4.1.) might at least partly explain the 
phenomenon. The Öcalan sympathizing participants regarded the political transformations and 
the so-called social revolution in Rojava as an inspiration and a model to follow, whereas the 
unaffiliated ones expressed criticism and reservation towards the actions of the PYD party and 
its administration in northern Syria. This kind of division along the Kurdish party political is 
not unheard of in the Kurdish diaspora communities. Wahlbeck (2018, 420) has noted that 
political disagreements are often a source of serious conflicts within dispersed Kurdish 
communities. 
  
The number of Barzani and Öcalan supporting Kurds within Lebanon remains unclear. It was 
suggested by Nasser Meho, the president of the Lebanese Kurdish Association of Ain Mreisse 
and Mina el Hosn, that 80 percent of the Kurds would support Barzani. In the same way as the 
KNC in Syria (see above 4.1.), he criticized the PYD for silencing criticism and being 
undemocratic. According to him, Lebanese Kurds like Rojava, but they are not fond of the 
politics of the PYD. In the view of Khaled Osman, the president of the Lebanese Kurdish 
Philanthropic Association, the Lebanese Kurds follow the developments in northern Syria with 
curiosity, for many of them have relatives in the area. He did not take a clear stand pro or against 
the PYD-led administration but considered the topic of Rojava important for all the Kurds, as 
it is part of Kurdistan. He portrayed that when the Kurds in Syria are hurt, also the Kurds in 
Lebanon feel the pain.  
  
Hanan Osman, the president of the Newroz Association, and Bushra Ali, the president of the 
Jin Women’s Association, sympathize with the ideology of Öcalan and the political 
transformations of the PYD-led administration in NES. According to them, there is a big interest 
and support to the self-governance in Rojava among Lebanese Kurds. Hanan Osman stated that 
the so-called Rojava revolution has had an impact on the social and political life of the Kurdish 
community in Lebanon, and they are following the social developments and the political way 
of acting of Syrian Kurds. She claimed that Lebanese Kurds see Syrian Kurds as role models 
and as a symbol of revolutionary work. Furthermore, many Kurds have visited Rojava to learn 
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about the revolution, and they have given lectures about the topic after returning to Lebanon. 
Some Kurds have even gone to defend Rojava militarily, for example, during the Kobane war. 
 
 
6.3. Transnational processes related to Rojava 
Transnational women’s advocacy networks form the basis for most of the processes of 
transnational contention that connect Lebanese Kurds and Rojava. The Newroz Association and 
the Jin Women’s Association have relations with the women’s umbrella organization Congress 
Star in NES, and women’s rights and empowerment are in a central role in their activities. The 
former organizes training for women, with various topics such as human rights, political 
participation, and self-defense, while the latter aims to create a platform to connect different 
women’s organizations in the Middle East, and the Newroz Association is a member of it. These 
associations sympathize with the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, and they refer to the political 
transformations and formation of the self-administration in Rojava as a revolution. They see 
the women’s movement in NES as an inspiration for their grassroots women’s activism in 
Lebanon. Even though they refuse to call their activities political, the civic activism conducted 
by them could be interpreted as such as it attempts for a social change (on civic activism, see 
above 2.3).  
  
Their activism is transnational by nature as it is inspired by the women’s movement in Rojava, 
it takes place within transnational coalitions, and is framed in the global human and women’s 
rights discourse. The coalitions formed between the Kurdish women’s rights organizations in 
Rojava and Lebanon can be seen as a feature of a transnational advocacy network, as they work 
on a common issue with shared values, common discourse, and exchange of information (on 
transnational advocacy networks, see above 2.3). In the following chapters, I will present a 
more detailed analysis of the features of diffusion, transnational coalition formation, and 
framing that I observed among the transnational Kurdish women’s movement between Rojava 






6.3.1. Diffusion of the Kurdish women’s movement 
The women’s rights activism conducted by the Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s 
Association are largely inspired by the Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava. These two 
associations describe Rojava as a symbol and source of power in their work, and the women’s 
movement in the area as pioneering. I observed diffusion of forms of action and ideology 
regarding the issue from northern Syria to Lebanon (on diffusion, see above 2.4). The leaders 
of these associations sympathize with the ideology of Öcalan on the self-governance of the 
Kurds and the empowerment of the society through the empowerment of women. Many of the 
aspects they mentioned in the interviews were similar to the content of the brochure of the 
Congress Star, the umbrella women’s organization in NES. The president of the Newroz 
Association, Hanan Osman, described the Rojava revolution as something incredible and a 
great thing in the history of Kurds in both politically and in the terms of women’s rights. She 
considers it to be significant that different ethnic groups are presented in the governance system, 
and regards it as a sign of democracy. Regarding the women’s rights advancements in NES (see 
above 4.2.), she refers to the new laws that prohibit polygamy, child marriage, and paying 
dowry. Moreover, she suggested that the violence against women in Rojava has decreased due 
to the criminalization of honour killing. According to her, these political and social 
developments have affected Lebanese Kurds: 
 
HO: We, as association, we see the revolution of Rojava as a great thing in the history of 
the Kurdish people recently, because what the Kurds did in northern Syria was something 
incredible. They established a self-government, and in this government they have all the 
ethnic groups with Arab, Syrian, Armenian, and each one can participate with their own 
language, his own flag, his own colour, so you can see democracy. This is in political 
way. On the woman way it was great also, because they gave women a lot of rights, and 
a right that even women can establish her own army and can fight. And in Rojava also, 
many rule has changed now. For example, they cannot marry a lot of women, they have 
to marry just one. A young girl shouldn’t be married, it’s forbidden. It’s forbidden to pay 
money when you get married with a woman, you shouldn’t pay for her, because she’s not 
an object for selling. And the violence is less now, you cannot put violence against women, 
because it’s forbidden. You cannot kill woman just to say “I protected my honour” or 
“she has a relation”. So, many thing changed, and this affect the Kurds in Lebanon as 
well. 
 
According to her, the Newroz Association does not have activities regarding Rojava, but they 
talk about it in the activities and often the discussion automatically goes to the subject. Ghazale 
Ramo, representative in the committee of the association, indicated that the Rojava revolution 




GR: The revolution affected a lot the Kurds here, and we wanted to be part of this 
revolution and we are so proud of them, especially the women. When we go anywhere we 
talk about this experience. So it’s a great thing that happened. 
 
Bushra Ali, the president of Jin Women’s Association and originally from Rojava herself, 
described Rojava as an essential part of the association and as their source of power. The 
women’s revolution has made her believe that as a united force women can achieve anything. 
According to her, the different ethnic groups did not know each other in Rojava before, but now 
the revolution has shown that they live and work together and empower each other: 
 
BA: It’s [Rojava] like a source of giving us power. -- And empower us, and we think there 
isn’t anything it’s impossible. It made us think everything is possible. -- And we see that 
women, if they are related to each other and united force, everything would be possible, 
they can do a lot of achievements. -- For example we were in Rojava, but we didn’t know 
Arabs. Arabs didn’t know us. We didn’t know Armenians or Assyrians and they didn’t 
know us. But this revolution shows us we can live together, we can work together, we can 
empower each other. So it is one side of what happened. 
 
According to Ali, the aim of the association is to put light on the strategic side of the women’s 
revolution in and the resistance of the Kurdish women. She suggests that the Rojava revolution 
has a bigger message than just that Kurdish women can hold weapons and fight, as it has already 
been shown in the media across the world. She herself has deeply dived into to the topic and 
written a book about the organizational and strategic side of it. In her own words, she travels to 
northern Syria regularly to study the revolution, women’s political participation, liberation and 
fight for freedom. In Lebanon, the association holds conferences and meeting around the issue. 
Just like it was written in the brochure of the Congress Star (2018) (see above 4.2.), Ali 
compared the significance of the Rojava revolution to the impacts the French and the Russian 
revolutions have had to the world. According to her, it would be injustice to say that relevance 
of the revolution would be limited only to the geographical area of northern Syria. She believed 
that the experience of the Kurdish women could benefit the Lebanese women too, and that is 
the reason why she left Suleimaniya, where she earlier was working in a women’s association, 
to establish the Jin Women’s association in Lebanon: 
 
BA: We want to show the Lebanese woman how they can benefit and how they can take 
experience from the Kurdish woman. This is how we are here for. To show them how the 
Lebanese woman or the Arab woman benefit according to the circumstances and 




According to its brochure (2018), the Congress Star follows Öcalan’s ideology and principles 
on democratic confederalism and women’s empowerment. It states that the organization aims 
to “develop a free Rojava, a democratic Syria, and a democratic Middle East by promoting 
women’s freedom and the concept of the democratic nation”. Moreover, it “takes the 
development of a revolution in women’s freedom throughout the Middle East as its basic goal, 
predicated on the development of such a revolution in Rojava and Syria” (on Congress Star, see 
above 4.2.). These citations depict the will of the Congress Star to spread its ideology and the 
so-called women’s revolution of Rojava as a model for women’s liberation across the Middle 
East. Moreover, they depict that democratic confederalim is also one of the main pillars of the 
women’s umbrella organization. The Newroz Association and the Jin Association also support 
the self-administration model developed by Öcalan. According to Hanan Osman and Bushra 
Ali, it would be the best solution for the future of Syria. Osman directly referred to the books 
of Öcalan saying that Kurds should not try to establish an independent Kurdish state with 
official borders, but instead aim for the foundation of a democratic nation where all the different 
ethnic groups could live freely and with the guarantee of basic rights: 
 
HO: I think it is the best, specially this scenario or this solution, we can call it, it is the 
view or the map that leader Öcalan, who is in prison for 20 years in Imrali.  As I told you 
before, he has written five huge books about the solution of the Kurdish problem. And he 
is saying in these books that Kurds cannot build a country of their own, it’s very hard to 
establish a country with borders, so the Kurds should not ask for borders or for liberation 
a country. They should be liberated by their culture and have a democratic nation, not a 
state of our own.  
 
Ali stated that the Syrian conflict should be solved by Syrian people and Rojava shows the best 
model for the future of the country. The ideal solution would be a self-government and a non-
central Syrian government, which would allow each of the different groups to govern 
themselves and include a fair presentation of them in the Syrian government: 
 
BA: I think the best scenario is that Syrian issue to be solved by the Syrian people, and 
the best scenario is already shown in Rojava. So the best thing is to have self-government 
with a non-central Syrian government. Each part or each piece in Syrian can be 
governing himself by himself without the intersection of the government or putting 
pressure on those people or ethnic groups, who live there. So each one can administrate 
himself by himself and the government would be one government with all those people be 
involved in it, and there wouldn’t be division between us and the Syrian government. One 
Syrian state with all those ethnic groups who can be represented in it. So self-government 




In the case of Lebanese Kurds and Rojava, it seems that at least two out the three needed 
mechanisms for the domestication of a diffusion can be found (on the domestication, see chapter 
2.6.). There exists brokerage between the originators (the Congress Star) and the adopters (The 
Newroz Assocition and the Jin Association) of the idea, and the new forms of action have been 
successfully mobilized by the sympathetic activists in Lebanon.  
 
 
6.3.2. Transnational coalitions: the Congress Star and the demonstrations 
The Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s Association are part of transnational women’s 
organization networks, and they both have relations with the umbrella women’s organization 
in NES, the Congress Star. Besides this, the Newroz Association is part of multiple of women’s 
organizations in Lebanon, such as the Lebanese women’s council and the Lebanese Democratic 
Women’s organization. According to Hanan Osman, the Newroz Association does not hold 
formal meetings with the representatives of the Congress Star, but they have attended their 
conferences and visited northern Syria several times. For example, the committee of the 
association visited the Jinwar Women’s Village that provides a safe place for women who have 
faced violence and who have been freed from ISIS. In the village the women organize 
everything from shops and supermarkets to cooking and fixing cars entirely without men, and 
according to Osman, the association wanted to go and study the experience. The association 
also participated in the Women’s Day March in Afrin to show their solidarity and support to 
the locals under the Turkish attack. The representatives of the Congress Star have also visited 
Lebanon: 
 
HO: We have relation with a woman organisation called Congress Star, it’s also a 
woman’s organisation in north Syria and they are very active. They come to Lebanon, go 
to Europe. So when they come here, and several time we went and met them in Rojava, 
and they held many conferences, so we are also member of that organization.  
 
Bushra Ali, the president of the Jin Women’s Association also tries to visit Rojava every year 
to see what is going on with the women’s case and to learn about the local civil society 
movement. Since she is originally from Rojava, she has a lot of important contacts in the area 
and she is regularly in touch with the Congress Star and has been invited to participate in their 
conferences and workshops around the women’s issue. She has also invited representatives of 




BA: There is a woman organisation called Congress Star, which is a woman 
organization, the biggest one in northern Syria. -- So for example we get some invitation 
to participate in conferences or workshops, and all those conferences and workshops 
want to highlight the situation of Rojava especially with the woman revolution. Sometimes 
we ask one responsible from Rojava to come, beside me she can come and express what’s 
going on, especially on the revolution of woman. 
 
In parallel, the brochure of the Congress Star highlights that its Diplomatic Relations 
Committee has participated in several international forums around the world. It also mentioned 
that foreign delegations and women’s organizations have visited the organization to learn about 
the Kurdish women’s struggle in Rojava and about the mechanisms of women’s self-
organization (see above 4.2.). It is characteristic for transnational advocacy networks to this 
way encourage the development of local movements and to support their grassroots 
mobilization by offering models for effective local action (on encouragement of local 
movements, see above 2.3.).  
 
These transnational networks that the Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s Association 
have with the Congress Star could be interpreted as loose long term loose transnational 
federation coalitions (on transnational coalitions, see above 2.4.). Moreover, it could be 
suggested that the associations act as translators or brokers (on the concepts, see above 2.6.) 
between the origins of the ideas that have spread or diffused from Rojava and their new context 
in Lebanon. As it was mentioned in chapter 2.6, the presence of successful mobilization on the 
part of sympathetic or enthusiastic activists is important in the domestication of an innovation. 
Furthermore, the existence of well-connected trust networks and movement brokers enable 
diffusion (see above 2.4.).  Bushra Ali, the leader of the Jin Association, described the role of 
the association as a bridge between Rojava and Lebanon: 
 
BA: We want to show the Lebanese woman how they can benefit and how they can take 
experience from the Kurdish woman. This is how we are here for. To show them how the 
Lebanese woman or the Arab woman benefit according to the circumstances and 
conditions they live under. We have to be like a bridge between those two parts.  
 
The demonstrations organized by the Kurds in Beirut, mentioned in the introduction of this 
thesis, provide an example of short term event coalitions in the context of Lebanese Kurds and 
Rojava, as they have from time to time erupted to protest the Turkish interventions in northern 
Syria (on event coalitions, see above 2.4.). All the association leaders stated that their 
association does not take part in politics and does not have a role in organizing the 
47 
 
demonstrations. Instead, the demonstrations have been spontaneous and emotional gatherings 
of ordinary Kurds. According to Hanan Osman and Bushra Ali, sometimes the demonstrations 
have been called together by the Kurdish community councils found in the areas of Kurdish 
concentrations in Beirut, which have the mission to solve social issues and arguments within 
the community. According to the unaffiliated Syrian Kurd, the KDPL party could organize 
some demonstrations with a legal permission when it still had a licence to operate in Lebanon. 
 
According to Hanan Osman, there were many demonstrations especially during the Turkish 
interventions in Kobane and Afrin. According to her, the Kurds naturally gathered and protested 
without the associations organizing it. However, once the representatives of different Lebanese 
Kurdish associations gave a speech together to support the Kurds in Syria. Also Khaled Osman, 
the president of the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association, described the demonstrations 
as emotional reactions of the Kurds to the events in Rojava. Notwithstanding, he stated that the 
majority of the people present in them have been sympathizers of the PKK, and there have been 
also many Syrian Kurds. The president of the Jin Women’s Association, Bushra Ali, stated that 
the Syrian Kurds organize themselves according to the law in Lebanon, and they naturally go 
and protest to the events in Rojava and they give aid based on their economic situation. 
According to her, the Kurds organize themselves by themselves, and as the Syrians were already 
organized before coming to Lebanon, it is easy for them. 
 
In February 2021, the Newroz Association, the Jin Women’s Association with the 
representatives of the PYD party and the Congress Star organized a common demonstration in 
Beirut demanding for the release of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (ANHA 
February 15, 2021). Also the representatives of the Armenian world in Lebanon participated. 
Hundreds of Kurds gathered in front of the UNHCR in Beirut and made appeals to the 
international community to take actions for the liberation of Öcalan (ibid.). This is also a clear 
sign of transnational coalition formation, and might imply that the relations between the 
Lebanese associations and the Congress Star would be moving towards a more solid campaign 
coalition (on campaign coalitions, see above 2.4.). This and the other demonstrations organized 






6.3.3. Externalization of the conflict by the NES administration 
As it turned out in the interview with the Newroz Association, some political leaders of NES 
have visited Lebanon in order to seek support from the Lebanese government and from the 
Lebanese Kurds. They have met with some of the Lebanese politicians, such as MPs and parties, 
and sometimes held conferences to meet with the Kurdish community in Lebanon, and they 
have also visited the Newroz Association. According Hanan Osman, the leader of Newroz 
Association, the aim of these visits has been to put light on the so-called Rojava revolution and 
to gather support from Lebanese people, Kurds, and women’s organizations. According to her, 
there is a lot of propaganda against the NES administration and the media abstains from fully 
covering the issue due to pressure from the Turkish government. 
 
These activities of NES political leaders can be interpreted as externalization of the conflict in 
Syria (on externalization, see above 2.4.). The Kurds in Syria are stuck between a rock and a 
hard place, as they on the one hand seek legitimacy for their self-governance and wish to be 
recognized as a federal entity apart from the Syrian central government, and on the other hand 
face a continuous threat from Turkey which tries to prevent the formation of permanent and 
stable Kurdish rule in northern Syria (on these issues, see above 4.1 and 4.3.). The NES 
administration could be seen as a weak sub-state but quasi-state actor, who seeks more powerful 
international allies from abroad and thus itself acts as a transnational actor. As it has been 
mentioned earlier, externalization of domestic contention and the formation of durable 
transnational coalitions are the strongest signs that a fusion of domestic and international 
contention is taking place, and they the greatest potential to create transnational social 
movements (see above 2.4.). The presence of these both factors in the context of Lebanese 
Kurds and Rojava implies that there is potential for long-term transnational formation between 
the parties.  
 
 
6.3.4. Framing in the global human rights discourse 
As it has been noticeable also in the previous parts of this chapter, the associations involved in 
women’s rights activism mostly framed the Rojava issue by the terms of global human and 
women’s rights. For example, the president of the Newroz Association described the 
development of the self-administration in NES as a significant achievement for Syrian Kurds, 
since through it they have achieved many basic rights that they were earlier deprived of. She 
listed many such things: denial of political participation, practicing of Kurdish culture and 
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festivals, using Kurdish language and naming children with Kurdish names, imprisonment and 
torture for political activism. She also expressed her wish that the Syrian government would 
become more democratic and finally grant the basic rights to the different ethnicities that live 
in the country:  
 
HO: It’s very important what’s going on in Rojava. It’s their right and part of the history 
of the Kurdish resistance, and the Kurds in Syria their work have arrived many rights. 
Maybe the Syrian regime did not massacre them, maybe they [the regime] didn’t do as 
Turkey has done during the past years. But also in Syria the Kurds could not participate 
in politics, they couldn’t practice their culture, they couldn’t use their language, they 
couldn’t even name their babies, it was forbidden to name them [with Kurdish names]. 
They had to have, for example, if have a Kurdish name, they went to register a girl, they 
would give her another name, without knowing what’s her name on the paper. So it was 
a tragedy. They couldn’t practice their festivals, for example we have Newroz festival, it 
was forbidden. They use to do it inside houses, many of them were in jail, they were 
tortured, they were killed just for asking or demanding for the Kurdish right for politics 
and political work. So it was tragedy. It is a time for the Syrian government to be more 
democratic and the Kurds to be part of this institution and give everyone his right, not 
just for the Kurd.  
 
The same phenomenon was prevalent in the analysis of the diffusion of ideology and forms of 
action from the Kurdish women’s rights movement in NES to Lebanon. Regarding the women’s 
rights advancements in NES, Hanan Osman mentioned e.g. the laws that prohibit polygamy, 
child marriage, and paying dowry and criminalization of honour killings:  
 
HO: We, as association, we see the revolution of Rojava, was a great thing in the history 
of the Kurdish people recently, because what the Kurds did in Northern Syria was 
something incredible. They established a self-government, and in this government they 
have all the ethnic groups with Arab, Syrian, Armenian, and each one can participate 
with their own language, his own flag, his own colour, so you can see democracy. This is 
in political way. On the woman way it was great also, because they gave women a lot of 
rights, and a right that even women can establish her own army and can fight. And in 
Rojava also, there is many rule has changed now. For example, they cannot marry a lot 
of women, they have to marry just one. A young girl shouldn’t be married, it’s forbidden. 
It’s forbidden to pay money when you get married with a woman, you shouldn’t pay for 
her, because she’s not an object for selling. And the violence is less now, you cannot put 
violence against women, because it’s forbidden. You cannot kill woman just to say “I 
protected my honour” or “she has a relation”. So, many thing changed, and this affect 
the Kurds in Lebanon as well. 
 
Both of these examples could be considered as signs of global framing process, and as it was 
mentioned earlier, diffusion is often present in global framing (on global framing and diffusion, 
see above 2.4.). A similar kind of framing can also be found in the brochure of the Congress 
50 
 
Star (2018), presented in chapter 4.2. It could be speculated that along with the ideology, the 
style of framing would have also diffused from northern Syria to Lebanon. The parallel use of 
discourse is one of the factors that illustrate the ideological affinity and connection between the 
Newroz Association, the Jin Association, and the Congress Star.  
  
Although it was not in the primary scope of my study, this tempts me to speculate about the 
purpose of the use of the frame. As it was mentioned in chapter 2.5., sometimes it is beneficial 
for transnational actors to adjust their agendas to conform to internationally approved 
discourses of human rights, as it might draw more attention and support from outsiders than a 
merely ethnic or national one. Hence, framing is also related to the externalization of 
contention. As mentioned in chapter 2.4., externalization often starts with the blockage of 
domestic claims, which leads to a desire for transnational intervention, and in order to make the 
case interesting to the foreign audience, it must be framed in an appealing way, such as by the 
use of international symbols or global human rights language. This leads to contemplating on 
the possibility that by emphasizing the human rights and women’s rights discourses, the 
officials of NES might seek to solicit more support from outsiders. Namely, it has been argued 
in the recent research on Kurds and transnationalism that the tendency of Kurdish diasporas to 
present Kurds as victims of persecution has functioned to motivate transnational political 
mobilization (see above 2.7.).  
  
As mentioned in chapter 2.5., dispersed communities may try to influence homeland politics by 
disseminating their vision of national identity and politics and to gain legitimacy or recognition 
for their homeland as an independent state. In the case of Rojava, legitimacy would not be 
sought for an independent state but for the PYD-led self-governance. However, it would require 
more study to adequately conclude that to which extend this is relevant in the framing of Rojava 
carried out by the Lebanese Kurds. The speculation does not stand for narrowing down the 






This thesis aimed to provide a transnational perspective to Lebanese Kurds, particularly on their 
activism and networks related to Rojava, the Kurdish areas of northern Syria. The objective 
was to find out whether, and by which means, Kurds in Lebanon try to influence the Rojava 
issue and whether they are part of some transnational networks related to Rojava. In short, it 
seems that the Kurds do not seek to influence the issue directly apart from the demonstrations 
organized in Beirut, at least not through the associations interviewed for the research. This is 
probably partly due to the limited political opportunities of the Kurds in Lebanon. Furthermore, 
it seems that the community is divided along the borderlines of the Kurdish party political 
between the supporters of Abdullah Öcalan and those of Masoud Barzani. The political side is 
projected in the attitudes of the Kurds towards Rojava. The transnational networks between 
Lebanese Kurds and Rojava center on the sympathizers of Abdullah Öcalan. The so-called 
revolution in Rojava has had a significant impact on the thinking of this part of the community. 
The majority of the Kurdish demonstrators in Beirut have been sympathizers of Öcalan and the 
PKK party. Also, many Syrian Kurds have been present. The sympathizers of Öcalan describe 
the Rojava revolution as an inspiration and source of power in their work. Thus, I argue that the 
relationship between the Lebanese Kurds and Rojava is reciprocal. Simultaneously, the 
Lebanese Kurdish community acts towards Rojava and is influenced by the political and social 
developments in the area. 
  
The material of my study was based on five semi-structured interviews conducted with the 
leaders of four Lebanese Kurdish associations (the Newroz Social and Cultural Association, the 
Lebanese Kurdish Association of Ain Mreiseh and Mina el Hosn, the Jin Women’s Association, 
and the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association) and one unaffiliated Syrian Kurd in 
Beirut in summer 2019. I analyzed the material through the framework of transnational 
activism, transnational networks, and forms of transnational contention. Moreover, I examined 
some characteristics of the transnationalism of ethnic diasporas and transnational impacts on 
domestic activism. Furthermore, I contextualized the substance by presenting an overview of 
the history of the Kurds in Lebanon, the recent political developments in the Kurdish areas of 
northern Syria, and the Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava. I also followed the reporting 
on Lebanese Kurds and Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lebanese and Kurdish media. Moreover, 
during the interviews, I tried to map the general situation and the number of Lebanese Kurds 
and Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lebanon. This extensive contextualization was essential for 
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comprehending the material and the transnational processes between Lebanese Kurds and 
Rojava. 
  
Those interviewees who sympathize with Öcalan are involved in grassroots women’s activism 
related to the Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava. Furthermore, transnational women’s 
advocacy networks form the basis for most transnational processes that connect Lebanese 
Kurds and Rojava. The Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s Association have contact 
with the women’s umbrella organization Congress Star in NES. Women’s rights and 
empowerment play a central role in their activities. While they said they do not directly aim to 
influence the issue, their grassroots activism was largely influenced and inspired by the Kurdish 
women’s movement in Rojava. Hence, I argue that the leaders of these associations act as 
translators or brokers (on the concepts, see above 2.3.), who help to bring and adapt these new 
ideas from Rojava to their new context in Lebanon.  
  
Regarding the processes of transnational contention (see above 2.4.) I observed: 1) diffusion of 
ideas and forms of action from Rojava to Lebanon through the transnational women’s 
organization networks 2) transnational long term coalition formation between the Congress Star 
in Rojava and the Newroz Association and the Jin Women’s Association in Lebanon 3) 
formation of short term transnational event coalitions in the course of Turkish interventions in 
Rojava 4) externalization of the Rojava conflict by NES administration through seeking 
international allies from Lebanon 5) global framing of the Rojava issue in terms of global 
human and women’s rights discourse.  
  
Traditionally, the transnational ties between the Lebanese Kurdish community and Kurdistan 
have been close-knit. The development of their first political and social organizations in the 
1950-60s was largely influenced by Kurdish leaders in Iraq and politically active Syrian Kurds 
in Lebanon (see above 3.2.). Hence, the current influence of Rojava on the minds and the social 
and political organization of Lebanese Kurds continues the same course of action. It seems that 
the Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava has encouraged an unprecedented wave of Kurdish 
women’s activism in Lebanon since two associations that work on the issue have been 
established since 2014. The observations conform to the argument that Kurdish organizations 
in exile are often influenced by the political and social movements in Kurdistan at their outset 
(see above 2.7.). Moreover, they demonstrate the claim that diaspora populations can 
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simultaneously act and engage towards the so-called homeland and the country of residence 
(see above 2.7.).  
  
The events in Kurdistan have always influenced the Kurds in Lebanon. The history behind the 
transnational influence of Kurdish national politics in Lebanon might partly explain the present 
impact of the events in Rojava on the Lebanese Kurds. In the recent study of transnationalism 
among the Kurds, it has been highlighted that the dispersed Kurdish communities are 
characterized by the various contemporary political developments in the Kurdish regions in 
Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria (see above 2.7.). It has been detected that political developments 
in Kurdistan have a direct link to social relations and political activities among diaspora Kurds 
(see above 2.7.). These arguments seem to be valid also in the context of the Lebanese Kurds 
and Rojava. 
  
The lack of patronage and political opportunities in Lebanon might also partly lead the Kurds 
to look outside for an alternative. Some studies have suggested that in situations where Kurds 
are pressed to identify with the state, they tend to turn towards their cross-border ethnic kin (see 
above 2.7.). It has also been argued that engagement in transnational activities may empower 
the members of dispersed communities (see above 2.5.). It is worth mentioning that although 
the Öcalan sympathizing associations saw democratic confederalism and self-governance as 
the ideal administrative system for northern Syria, they did not raise it a solution for the 
dysfunctional Lebanese confessional system. 
  
This thesis provided one perspective to transnational activism and networks between Lebanese 
Kurds and Rojava. Furthermore, it has drawn new information on the Kurdish community in 
Lebanon and highlighted their position in the transnational formation of the Kurds in the Middle 
East. Moreover, the study has provided new aspects to the recent history of the Kurds in 
Lebanon and Syria. It has also highlighted the impact of the recent political developments in 
Rojava on the dispersed Kurdish communities in Lebanon and elsewhere. 
  
Despite the extensive contextualization of the interviews, a broader sampling among the 
Kurdish community would be useful to confirm the findings. Four of the interviews were 
conducted with the leaders of Lebanese Kurdish associations, who likely hold a higher social 
position with more years of education than the Kurds in Lebanon by average, which means that 
their opinions might differ from the general public. Moreover, I began the research as an 
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outsider, without much prior knowledge about the complexities of the community. It might 
have caused me to leave out some relevant questions or aspects, even though I tried to minimize 
the prospect by semi-structured interviews and giving space for the informants. Also, a tiny 
language barrier occurred sometimes between my participants and me, as my Arabic skills were 
not completely fluent in 2019. Developing my Arabic vocabulary would allow me to ask more 
precise follow-up questions in the future and take the Arabic conversations to a deeper level 
with those who master only a little English. 
  
A more focused study on the Kurdish women’s movement and its impacts in Lebanon would 
undoubtedly be required soon. It could be easily done, for example, by the examination of the 
social media channels of the Kurdish women’s associations. A more comprehensive analysis 
of the forms of action of Kurdish women’s activism in Lebanon would also be needed. A 
comparative study in some other dispersed Kurdish communities would be required to unravel 
the prevalence of the diffusion of the Kurdish women’s movement in Rojava to elsewhere. It 
would also be interesting to research the transnational networks of Kurdish women’s 
organizations in the Middle East on a larger scale. The transnational formation between the 
Lebanese Kurdish community and the KRG should be naturally studied as well. 
  
All in all, the Kurdish community in Lebanon has been tremendously understudied in the 
academic field. Only a few articles, Meho (2002), Kawtharani & Meho (2005), and Hourani 
(2011), have addressed the topic during the two first decades of the millennium. A revised 
overview of the Kurds’ present social and political organization would come in handy and 
provide a basis for further research on the community. It would be interesting to study the 
Kurds’ relations with the Lebanese Arab and Armenian populations. A fascinating topic would 
be the networks and allegiances formed by the Lebanese Kurds in the sectarian political system 
of Lebanon. At times, parts of the Kurdish community have formed loyalties with the Sunni 
Future Movement, the pan-Sufi Al Ahbash, the Shia Hezbollah (on these, see above 3.3.), and 
the Armenian Tachnak party (Tejel 2009, 18). Furthermore, the number and the overall situation 
of the Syrian Kurdish refugees in Lebanon post-2011 should be surveyed more thoroughly. In 
the coming years, it remains to be seen whether the Syrian war will be considered a factor that 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWEES 
 
1. Hanan Osman and Ghazale Ramo, Newroz Cultural and Social Association, Beirut, July 2019 
 
2. Nasser Meho, the Lebanese Kurdish Association of Ain Mreisse and Mina el Hosn, Beirut, 
July 2019 
 
3. Bushra Ali, Jin Women’s Association, Beirut, July 2019 
 
4. Khaled Osman, the Lebanese Kurdish Philanthropic Association, Beirut, July 2019 
 






APPENDIX B: THE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Questions: 
 
Theme A: Background information about the association/party 
1. When and how was the association/party established? 
2. What is the purpose of the association/party? 
3. What kind of activities do you have? 
4. How many members do you have? 
5. Who are leading the association/party? 
6. Are you part of some kind of transnational networks? 
7. How did you come to the association/party and what are your responsibilities? 
 
Theme B: Situation of the Lebanese Kurds 
1. How many Kurds would you say that there are in Lebanon? 
2. How would you describe their situation? 
3. From which areas are they originally from and when did they come to Lebanon? 
4. Are the Lebanese Kurds politically active in general? 
5. Did any Kurds escape the Syrian civil war to Lebanon? Around how many? 
6. Are they politically active in Lebanon? 
 
Theme C: Relations to Rojava 
1. How would you describe your association/party viewpoint to Rojava? 
2. What kind of relations do you have to Rojava? (e.x. relatives, friends, political people) 
3. Are there political movement between the Lebanese Kurdish community and Rojava? 
4. What kind of activities do you have regarding the Rojava issue? (e.x. protests) 
5. Do you aim to influence the Rojava issue somehow? 
6. What is your goal regarding that? 
7. What are your means and strategies to reach this goal?  
8. How big part does the Rojava issue form of the work and agenda setting of the 
association/party? 
9. Are the Lebanese Kurds interested in the Rojava issue in general? 
10. How important do you see the Rojava issue to all the Kurdish people and the Kurdish nation 
in general? 
